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Abstract 
 
This dissertation examines the relationship between environmental regulations and economic 
growth in the Appalachian Region. The study employs county attainment status data as a proxy 
for environmental regulations and allows the cross-sectional variation of the attainment variable. 
Cognizant of the fact that air pollution emanates from a variety of sources, the study assumes 
that per capita income, population, employment, and environmental regulations are jointly deter-
mined, which is the major distinction from previous studies which have assumed a unidirectional 
relationship between environmental regulations and economic growth.  
 
Using endogenous growth theory, a theoretical model is developed that highlights the role of 
environmental regulations in economic growth. The major theoretical conclusions reached 
suggest that: enforcement of environmental regulations affects economic performance only in the 
short-term, while in the long-term, firms become more efficient in production and output in-
creases. In the long-term, environmental regulations lead to improved environmental quality and 
this has a direct effect of stimulating growth in population, income, and employment.  
 
In the empirical applications, two econometric techniques are employed. First, the structural 
equations are estimated using three stage least squares. Second, the Spatial Durbin Model (SDM) 
is applied in order to account for spatial spillovers that emanate from neighboring counties. 
Results from the three stage least squares and SDM model are robust. The statistical evidence 
supports the theoretical analyses that enforcement of environmental regulations only affects 
regional growth in the short-term. Additional evidence from empirical models support the „jobs 
follow people‟ and „people follow jobs‟ hypotheses. In addition, empirical estimations show that 
changes in population, per capita income, and employment, including socio-economic, political, 
and demographic characteristics influence the stringency of environmental regulations.  
 
With regard to the SDM estimations, important findings are that a county‟s regional growth and 
environmental regulation stringency not only depend on own county characteristics, but are 
indirectly influenced by neighboring counties‟ characteristics. Furthermore, results from the 
SDM model indicate that there is some form of strategic interaction in environmental policy-
making among some counties in the Appalachian Region in the form of a race to the top.  
 
The research findings reinforce the need to design and implement environmental regulations that 
stimulate economic growth and enhance environmental quality. Another policy implication is 
that besides imposing stringent environmental regulations on major polluting industries, attention 
needs to be paid to other socio-economic and demographic forces that contribute to emission of 
pollutants.  
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CHAPTER 1 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 Introduction  
The debate over the impact of environmental regulations on economic growth has a long 
history (e.g., Denison, 1979; Portney, 1981; McConnell and Schwab, 1990). Generally, the belief 
is that environmental regulations are detrimental to economic growth; therefore, their 
implementation has been controversial among economists and environmental policymakers. The 
debates over the past three decades have been over how to design regulations that promote 
environmental quality without slowing economic growth. The general consensus is that many 
environmental problems such as global warming, water quality degradation, air quality problems, 
land degradation, habitat loss, resource exhaustion, municipal solid waste problems, and bio-
diversity loss are attributable to human activities. These environmental problems have been cited 
in many studies as having negative effects on the social and economic welfare of communities 
(e.g., Anselin et al., 2004; Waddell, 1974). For example, air pollution emanating from diverse 
sources generally imposes costs on society such as increased health, cleaning, and production 
expenses.  
Concern over air quality problems culminated in the passage of the Clean Air Act [CAA] 
in 1970, which was amended in 1977 and 1990. The CAA gave legislative powers to the 
Environmental Protection Agency [EPA] to develop a national clean air program that would 
establish uniform air quality standards. The 1970 Clean Air Act set National Ambient Air 
Quality Standards [NAAQS] for six major air pollutants: tropospheric ozone (O3), total suspen-
ded particulates (TSP), carbon monoxide (CO), sulfur dioxide (SO2), nitrogen dioxide (NO2), 
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and lead (Pb). The NAAQS are a set of standards that represent the maximum permissible 
ambient concentrations of the six pollutants. To promote public health and welfare, the CAA has 
assigned the primary responsibility for air pollution regulation to state and local governments 
(Condliffe and Morgan, 2009). Thus, state and local governments administer the CAA by 
developing state implementation plans (SIP) which outline how states are going to comply with 
federal pollution standards. This means that U.S. states retain considerable flexibility in the 
implementation and enforcement of environmental regulations; this is reflected in the variation 
of regulatory intensity among states (Levison, 2000). Areas within a state that fail to meet the 
NAAQS for the six criteria pollutants established by the EPA are designated as non-attainment 
areas. In 2004, the EPA designated 474 counties (out of 3,140 U.S. counties or equivalent 
jurisdictions) from 32 states and the District of Columbia as non-attainment for the ozone 
standard requirements and another 225 counties from 20 states were listed as non-attainment 
under the TSP standard or PM 2.5 (Esworthy, 2007). Counties that violate federal air quality 
standards expose their populations to dangerous toxics. 
Variations in environmental regulation implementation among and within states have 
significant impacts on the mobility of capital and other resources across local jurisdictions, and 
this may affect economic growth (Hosoe and Naito, 2006). For example, a county‟s non-
attainment status entails increased regulatory restrictions on pollution sources, and this, 
generally, results in increased pollution control compliance costs. In addition, the federal govern-
ment can withhold federal funding for highway construction in non-attainment counties and 
impose a ban on the construction of new plants that would significantly add to emissions. Thus, 
the designation of a county as non-attainment may result in loss of jobs and is likely to make a 
difference in whether or not it will be able to retain and attract businesses. In summary, the non-
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attainment designation puts an area at a competitive disadvantage relative to attainment areas by 
creating additional regulatory burdens for businesses (Harrison, 2008).  
Utility maximizing individuals and profit maximizing firms will take into account 
variations in environmental policy and economic incentives when choosing their location. This 
phenomenon is akin to Tiebout‟s sorting hypothesis: different preferences for environmental 
amenities will result in self-selection (Tiebout, 1956). This means that location choice decisions 
for households and firms involve a trade-off between economic factors as well as the quality of 
the environment. It is well known that the quality of the environment in U.S. states has been 
determined by local and state authorities. In spite of significant improvements in environmental 
quality in the U.S., environmental policymaking is an area that has drawn controversy in relation 
to its impact on economic growth. As discussed above, the general view is that environmental 
regulations thwart economic growth. For the purpose of this study, environmental regulation 
stringency is measured by county level attainment status of the federal air quality standard for 
O3, SO2, TSP, Pb, and CO.  
Contrary to the view that environmental regulations thwart economic growth, Porter 
(1991) and Porter and van der Linde (1995) argue that environmental regulations stimulate 
technological innovation and lead to industrial growth. This view is known as the Porter 
hypothesis. The Porter hypothesis posits that well designed environmental regulations result in a 
number of multiplier effects such as productivity improvement and improved firm profitability. 
Berman and Bui (2001) present evidence that supports the Porter hypothesis by showing that 
manufacturing productivity for the Los Angeles Air Basin refineries increased during the period 
1987-1992.  The Porter hypothesis could work because firms complying with state and local 
environmental regulations will invest in new capital equipment that improve productivity and at 
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the same time help reduce emissions of pollutants. An improvement in air quality has an amenity 
value and that may also affect the pattern of economic growth (Van, 2002; Grossman and 
Krueger, 1995).  
In response to the Porter hypothesis, a number of studies have attempted to shed more 
light on the relationship between environmental regulations and economic performance. Within 
this context, conflicting empirical results emerge. Goetz et al. (1996), for instance, argue that 
stringent environmental regulations result in increased environmental quality, which in turn helps 
to attract businesses, skilled workers, and wealthy citizens to regions with better environmental 
quality. This means that such regions experience employment growth, income growth, and 
demographic changes due to improved environmental quality (Gottlieb, 1995; Mobley and 
Izraeli, 1995; Izraeli, 1985).  
Some empirical studies have found evidence that contradicts the Porter hypothesis and 
show that environmental regulations negatively affect productivity and location decisions of new 
plants (Gray and Shadbegian, 1993; Jaffe, 1995; List and Co, 1999; Tannenwald, 1997). This 
means that environmental regulations can act as a barrier to the entry of polluting firms in a 
particular market. This may alter the structure of the market in terms of the number of firms in 
the industry entering a particular county and thereby reduce competition (Kohn, 1985). Standard 
neoclassical economic theory has shown that a profit maximizing firm takes into account 
environmental regulations prevailing in an area. Hence, investment decisions are influenced by 
the stringency of environmental regulations (Gray and Shadbegian, 1993). This view has led to 
the theory of a “race to the bottom,” a situation where environmental regulations in a particular 
locale move below optimal levels in order to be more attractive to firms than competing 
jurisdictions (Engel, 1997). Theoretically, lax environmental regulations allow firms to have 
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lower operating costs because they spend less on pollution control. Thus, reduced operating costs 
may result in higher profits and this may help retain businesses as well as attract businesses to a 
given jurisdiction.  
Many studies critical of Porter‟s hypothesis have argued that environmental compliance 
results in increased cost of production for polluting firms and higher prices for consumers. 
Undoubtedly, this results in the diversion of inputs which contribute to industrial productivity, 
consequently affecting relocation and investment decisions of firms. Productivity, broadly 
defined as output per unit of input, is believed to be an important determinant of competitiveness 
as well as an essential factor in economic growth and improved standard of living (APOGEE, 
1991). Yandle (1985, p. 39) points out that the “effects of environmental regulations go far 
beyond the physical plant closings and worker layoffs" and that the regional concentration of 
polluting industries may affect regional development. These views recognize the fact that 
manufacturing is not isolated from the rest of the national economy and that, therefore, the 
effects of environmental regulations on manufacturing may inadvertently affect other sectors of 
the economy which supply goods and services to the manufacturing sector, consequently 
affecting regional development. The effects may also result in welfare distortions in local 
communities which are heavily dependent on tax receipts and other royalties from polluting 
firms to finance public infrastructure programs (Tannenwald, 1997).  
From the foregoing discussion, it is clear that the impact of environmental regulation 
stringency on economic growth remains an open question. The inconsistencies in results in the 
literature can be attributed to a number of factors, including estimation methods, data issues, 
focus of study, and stated objectives. While some of the studies provide anecdotal evidence, 
many of the empirical studies have failed to produce irrefutable evidence on the interactions of 
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environmental regulations and regional growth. The central theme of previous studies has been 
to estimate the impact of environmental regulations on productivity changes and firm location 
choices. Previous studies have also overlooked the fact that indirect employment effects arise in 
firms supplying the producers of pro-environmental goods with capital or services to polluting 
firms. To this end, the pertinent question to be asked is: what is the role of local environmental 
regulation in regional development?  
In order to address this question, this research extends the work of Li (2006) who 
examines the impact of environmental regulations on employment and population change. Li 
utilizes a regional growth model that takes into account the interdependencies between em-
ployment and population changes, and how these growth factors are affected by environmental 
regulation stringency. The major shortcoming of Li‟s study is that it does not take into account 
the feedback relationship between environmental regulation stringency and changes in 
population and employment, respectively. In this study, it is argued that environmental regu-
lation stringency in a particular locale is likely to be jointly determined with other regional 
factors such as per capita income, population, and employment. Ostensibly, complying with 
environmental regulations results in the diversion of income from factors such as health, 
education, and housing that affect human welfare and economic growth. The literature on the 
environmental Kuznets curve shows that an increase in per capita income is associated with a 
decrease in pollution, because environmental quality is a normal good; hence demand for 
environmental quality increases through the income effect (Grossman and Krueger, 1995). This 
means that utility is likely to increase (decrease) as income goes up (down).  By the same token, 
changes in some of the socio-economic and demographic factors, including firms‟ rent seeking 
7 
 
activities, may influence the level of environmental regulations (Cole et al. 2006; Nelson et al. 
1986).  
The existing literature has examined only a portion of the larger problem. Therefore, any 
modeling attempting to understand the impacts of environmental regulations on regional growth 
should take into account simultaneous interactions among environmental regulations, income, 
population, and employment changes. Thus, the purpose of this study is to take a first step in 
filling the aforementioned gap in previous studies by using a four simultaneous equation model. 
The model captures the feedback relationships among population change, employment change, 
per capita income change, and environmental regulation [county attainment status].  
This study differs from previous studies in two fundamental ways. First, this study 
focuses on the role of environmental regulations in economic growth by capturing the 
interdependent relationship among changes in employment, population, per capita income, and 
environmental regulations. Thus, the analysis is extended beyond the firms and industries 
directly affected by environmental regulations. Using econometric techniques, this approach 
uniquely traces the structural relationships of the endogenous factors by utilizing a four-equation 
simultaneous regional growth model, a variant of the Deller et al. (2001) growth model.  
Second, the study considers the inter-jurisdictional differences in economic growth and 
environmental regulation stringency. This is aimed at capturing the spillover-effects resulting 
from the spatial heterogeneity in economic incentives and environmental policy making across 
jurisdictions by use of a Spatial Durbin Model (SDM). Thus, the second contribution of this 
study is the use of the spatial regression methodology that captures the direct effects, indirect 
effects (spillovers), and total effects arising from the changes in the dependent variables and 
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explanatory factors. The methodology developed by LeSage and Pace (2009) will form the basis 
for drawing conclusions on the statistical significance of the direct, indirect, and total effects.  
1.2 Profile of Study Area 
The study area is confined to the 410 counties of the Appalachian Region, which includes 
all of West Virginia and parts of Alabama, Georgia, Kentucky, Maryland, Mississippi, New 
York, North Carolina, Ohio, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Tennessee, and Virginia. The region 
is divided into three distinct geographic subregions: northern, central, and southern Appalachia, 
as shown in figure 1.1. Northern Appalachia includes counties of Maryland, Ohio, New York, 
Pennsylvania, and 46 counties in West Virginia. Central Appalachia includes counties in eastern 
parts of Kentucky, Tennessee, southwestern parts of Virginia, and 9 southern counties of West 
Virginia. Southern Appalachia consists of counties in Alabama, northern parts of Georgia, 
Mississippi, North and South Carolina, eastern parts of Tennessee, and western parts of Virginia. 
Of the three subregions, the northern region is the most urban, while the central region is the 
most rural. 
Data from the 2000 United States census of population indicate that the Appalachian 
region had a population of some 23 million, equivalent to 8 percent of the U.S. population. The 
net change in population between 1990 and 2000 for the Appalachian region was estimated to be 
9.5 percent, compared to the U.S rate of 13.1 percent. State populations range from roughly 1.8 
million in West Virginia to more than 5 million in the Appalachian counties of Pennsylvania. 
Population growth has been uneven due to marked differences in economic opportunities, terrain, 
services, infrastructure, and so forth.  
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Figure 1.1: Appalachian Counties and Subregions 
 
Source: Appalachian Regional Commission, 2002 
Poverty continues to be a challenge to the region‟s population (Glasmeier and Fuellhart, 
1999). In 2000, 13.6 percent of the region‟s population lived in poverty, as compared to 12.4 
percent of the U.S. population. Educational attainment in Appalachia is well below the national 
average. In 2000, for example, the percent of high school and college graduates, respectively, 
was 76.8 and 17.7 percent versus the U.S. figures of 80.4 and 24.4 percent. Regional levels of 
per capita income are also below those of the U.S. as a whole and labor force participation is 
lower than the U.S. average (Acs and Kallas, 2007). The number of jobs per 100 people in the 
Appalachian region is approximately 53.09 compared to the national rate of 59.59 jobs, 
underscoring the relative dearth of economic opportunities in the region. Table 1 summarizes 
important socioeconomic indicators in the Appalachian region. 
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Table 1.1: 2000 Economic and Demographic Indicators for Appalachian Region and the U.S. 
Indicator Appalachian Region United States 
Population (million) 22,894,017 281,421,906 
Per Capita Income ($) 27, 124 33,050 
Poverty Rate (%) 13.6 12.4 
Population 25 and Older with 4 years of College (%) 17.7 24.4 
Number of Jobs per 100 People 53.09 59.59 
 
The Appalachian Regional Commission (ARC), a state and federal partnership program, 
uses the level of local economic development as a basis for classifying counties into four 
categories: distressed, transitional, competitive, and attainment counties. Despite the fact that 
some counties are in better economic shape than they were in the 1990‟s, the region continues to 
grapple with economic challenges as seen by the increase in the number of distressed counties 
between 2002 and 2005 (see figures 1.2 and 1.3). 
As of 2004, a majority of the counties in Central Appalachia and a few counties located 
in Southern Appalachia were classified as distressed counties. Distressed counties are those with 
unemployment and poverty rates that are at least 1.5 times the national rate and a per capita 
income no greater than two-third of the national average. Transitional counties are those whose 
economies are transitioning between strong and weak economies. Counties with unemployment 
and poverty rates better than the national average are classified as competitive counties, while 
counties which are at par with national levels in terms of poverty, unemployment and income are 
classified as attainment.  
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Figure 1.2: 2002 Appalachian Counties’ Economic Status 
 
    
Figure 1.3: 2005 Appalachian Counties' Economic Status 
 
Source: Appalachia Regional Commission 
 
 
The Appalachian region‟s economy has been transformed over the last three decades and 
has moved from being an economy dependent on manufacturing, agriculture, and coal mining, to 
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one that is more diversified and more dependent on service sector employment (Wood, 2005). 
These structural changes have led to loss of jobs in the core industries of Appalachia, particularly 
the coal industry. Today, manufacturing, services, and government occupations account for the 
majority of jobs in the Appalachian region. 
The Appalachian region is chosen for two primary reasons. First, the 118 coal-mining 
counties of the Appalachian region account for more than one-third of the coal produced in the 
U.S., coal mining remains a major industrial activity for the region. Some air pollution because 
of coal related activities is therefore unavoidable (see figures 5.2 and 5.3). Given that coal is a 
cheap energy source, a number of coal-fired power plants and other industries have strategically 
located in the Appalachian region, resulting in emissions of: 
 Carbon dioxide, the major greenhouse gas that is linked to global warming.  
 Sulfur dioxide, a chemical that produces acid rain when it reacts with moisture. 
 Carbon monoxide, a colorless and odorless gas that has serious health impacts to both 
animals and humans 
 Nitrogen oxides, a chemical which leads to ozone and acid rain and causes serious 
health and environmental problems such as damage to lungs, reduced crop yield, 
among others. 
 Mercury, a chemical which eventually settles in water and has the potential to harm 
fish and other aquatic life, as well as humans. 
 Consequently, people who live in Appalachia are subject to environmental degradation and 
exposure to pollutants. Emissions of pollutants from industrial facilities, combined with emis-
sions from vehicles and agricultural processes have contributed to counties‟ non-attainment 
status for NAAQS. Enforcement of the federal air quality regulations is likely to have significant 
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impacts on manufacturing, coal mining, and other related industries, and on communities that 
depend on income from regulated industries. 
Secondly, considering that Appalachia is mostly rural and is confronted by a host of 
economic problems, such as high unemployment and poverty rates and low per capita income, 
the question that needs to be addressed by policymakers is whether the issue of environmental 
injustice applies to the region. The literature on environmental justice shows that the majority of 
polluting industrial facilities is in low income areas—implying that people of lower socio-eco-
nomic status will disproportionately suffer from environmental exposures (Morrone, 2008; 
Sicotte, 2009). Research also documents that residents of Appalachian coal-mining communities 
have increased incidences of lung cancer and mortality rates, and high hospitalization rates for 
cardiovascular and respiratory illnesses compared to other, non-coal mining, regions of the 
country (Hendryx, 2008).  
1.3 Problem Statement 
According to the U.S. Census Bureau, the U.S. population is expected to double in the 
next century and it is expected that this growth will cause significant environmental changes, 
assuming continuation of current trends in housing consumption, commuting, and infrastructure 
development (EPA, 2001). A growing body of literature also suggests that the increase in 
vehicle-miles traveled by cars and trucks is the leading source of air pollution (Cassady et al., 
2004).  
In order to protect the environment and safeguard public health, federal and state 
interventions are necessary. All environmental policy intervention causes consumers and 
producers to incur the cost externalities. Therefore, environmental regulation stringency 
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influences firms‟ and households‟ location decisions as well as their production and consumption 
decisions.  
There is a large body of literature on environmental regulations and economic per-
formance, but results are ambiguous. Cole et al. (2006) assert that this is because environmental 
regulations have been treated as exogenous. This suggests that an accurate representation in an 
econometric model must account for simultaneity between environmental regulation and 
economic growth. Given that environmental regulation has been treated as exogenous, most 
previous empirical studies assume unidirectional causality, which means that OLS estimation 
produces biased and inconsistent results. 
This study extends the knowledge by accounting for the feedback relationships, using a 
four equation simultaneous regional growth model that captures the interdependences among 
population, employment, per capita income, and environmental regulations. There is currently no 
study that has considered these interdependences. Figure 1.4 illustrates the simultaneous inter-
actions between environmental regulation and economic growth. 
 
 
  
Figure 1.4: Simultaneous Interactions between Environmental Regulations and Economic 
Growth 
County per 
Capita 
Income 
Environmental 
Regulations 
County Total 
Employment 
County 
Population 
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1.4 Research Justification 
Understanding the underlying process of developing and implementing environmental 
regulation that promotes environmental quality and also enhances economic growth is a 
challenging task for policymakers. In addition, implementation of policies such as air quality 
regulation requires an understanding of the dynamics between air pollution and economic growth 
because social and economic forces cause environmental change and thus influence a county‟s 
attainment status, while attainment status impacts a county‟s economic performance.  
The task of developing optimal policies that promote environmental quality and 
economic growth has become more complicated due to increased interstate economic compe-
tition. Increased interstate economic competition is hypothesized to cause a race to the bottom if 
states feel that they cannot adopt stricter environmental regulation than competitors1. To avert a 
race to the bottom, policymakers need to understand the direct and indirect effects of 
environmental regulation stringency on economic and demographic factors and vice versa. By 
extending the modeling beyond firms and industries directly affected by environmental 
regulations, this study is instructive regarding the impact of environmental regulations on econo-
mic performance. The results from this research are useful to local and state policymakers 
because they identify the potential to simultaneously promote economic growth and 
environmental quality.  
  
                                                          
1 The theory maintains that when states are confronted with interstate competition, states have an incentive to reduce 
environmental standards in order to attract mobile capital and thus gain competitive advantage over other 
jurisdictions. Engel (1997) provides a good exposition on the issue of race to the bottom. 
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1.5 Research Objectives 
The general objective of this research is to empirically examine the relationship between 
environmental regulations and changes in regional growth in the Appalachian region. The speci-
fic objectives are: 
1.0 To develop a model that takes into account the feedback relationships between income, 
employment, population and environmental regulations. 
2.0 To empirically determine the impact of county differences in environmental regulations on 
population, income, and employment and vice versa. 
3.0 To empirically identify the key regional growth factors that influence environmental 
regulation stringency. 
4.0 To draw relevant policy recommendations from the empirical findings. 
1.6 Hypotheses 
In order to analyze the relationship between environmental regulations and economic growth, 
this study will test the following five hypotheses: 
1. The share of manufacturing employment is inversely related to environmental regulation 
stringency but positively related to economic growth.    
2. Manufacturing industry establishments have a positive effect on employment growth, per 
capita income, and environmental regulation stringency. 
3. Environmental regulations positively affect income, population growth, and employment. 
This, implicitly tests the Porter hypothesis which suggests that environmental regulations, if 
properly designed, will spur economic growth in the long-term. 
4. Higher levels of per capita income raise the public‟s demand for environmental regulation, 
which translates into improved environmental quality. 
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5. Demographic variables and county characteristics such as population, unemployment rate, 
age, education, and race play a key role in environmental outcomes. 
1.7 Organization of the Study 
This study is organized into six chapters. Chapter 2 contains a review of the literature on 
environmental regulation and economic growth. Chapter 3 provides the theoretical foundation 
for developing the empirical model. Chapter 4 explains the method of estimation and introduces 
the data types and sources. Chapter 5 presents the empirical research findings and interpretation. 
Finally, chapter 6 concludes with a summary of the findings, policy implications, limitations, and 
suggestions for future research. 
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CHAPTER 2 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
2.0 Introduction 
This chapter provides a review of the literature on the environmental regulation-
economic growth relationship. The vast majority of past studies have exclusively focused on 
affected industries in the manufacturing sector. The justification for this is that many of the 
environmental policies are directed at manufacturing industries and, therefore, aggregate changes 
in employment, firm expansion or contraction directly affect the manufacturing industry (Bartik, 
1985). Consequently, several researchers including Condliffe and Morgan (2009), Duffy-Deno 
(1992), Gray and Shadbegian (2002), and Fredriksson and Millimet (2002) estimate the impact 
of environmental regulation on economic growth using a single equation. Many of these resear-
chers agree that the variables used as proxies for environmental regulations introduce endoge-
neity bias in the estimation because environmental regulations can be endogenously determined 
by a number of factors such as income, population, and employment change, and many other 
socio-economic characteristics. Thus, one unexplored area in the empirical literature is the use of 
structural equations in estimating the environmental regulations-economic growth relationship.  
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 2.2 provides a review on the 
measures of environmental regulations used in previous studies. Section 2.3 provides a review of 
literature on the demand and supply sides of environmental regulations and section 2.4 is a 
review of literature on the environmental regulation-economic growth relationship. Section 2.5 
provides an overview on the determinants of regional growth.  
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2.1 Measures of Environmental Regulation Stringency 
A survey of the literature reveals lack of agreement on the causal relationships between 
environmental regulation and regional growth (Gray and Shadbegian, 1993). There is also no 
agreement on the appropriate measure for environmental regulation at the county-and state-level, 
respectively. Consequently, various measures of environmental regulation have been used in past 
studies, as the following section shows.  
2.1.1 National Ambient Air Quality Standards 
The most widely used measure of environmental regulation stringency at the county-level 
is the attainment status of the CAA standard for NAAQS (Becker and Henderson, 2000; 
Fredriksson and Millet, 2001; Greenstone, 2002; List et al., 2003). Counties whose air quality 
meets federal standards have attainment status and counties that do not meet the standards are in 
non-attainment. The 1977 CAA amendments further impose stringent pollution control for new 
and expanding sources in non-attainment areas. In order to prevent the worsening of air quality 
in attainment areas, the 1977 amendments also set tougher standards for new sources in 
attainment areas by establishing the New Source Performance Standards (NSPS). The 1990 CAA 
amendments further strengthened regulations towards electric utilities by limiting the amount of 
sulfur dioxide and mercury emissions. In addition, the amendments introduced the sulfur dioxide 
emissions program and tightened motor vehicle emissions standards.  
Many studies show that air quality regulation imposed when a county fails to achieve 
federal ambient air quality standards negatively affect firm location and investment decisions, 
and productivity levels. New plants locating in non-attainment areas face more stringent (costly) 
environmental regulation than existing firms located in attainment counties. Therefore, non-
attainment is thought to discourage new business investment. Typically, new firms locating in 
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non-attainment counties are subject to a standard of Lowest Achievable Emission Rate (LAER), 
which imposes adoption of cleanest technologies, regardless of cost, while new firms locating in 
attainment counties are only required to install Best Available Technology (BAT). Therefore, 
Maloney and McCormick (1982) assert that the regulatory bias against new sources of 
environmental pollution protects existing firms from competition and allows them to earn posi-
tive economic profits. Differentiated regulation provides an incentive to retard the turnover of the 
capital stock if only new investments are subject to stricter regulation. This increases the cost of 
environmental protection and retards attainment of the desired minimum environmental quality 
(Duffy-Deno, 1992; Fullerton and Kim, 2006).   
2.1.2 Superfund Sites and Number of Inspections 
The second measure of environmental regulation stringency is the number of superfund 
sites in a county and its related costs. Under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, 
Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA) of 1980, the EPA is given power to place sites that 
pose an imminent and substantial danger to public welfare and the environment on the National 
Priorities List (NPL).2 The Superfund Act has also given the EPA the power to sue firms for the 
release of hazardous waste and compel them to clean-up, remediate, and pay monetary 
compensation for personal damage. Remediation costs typically include capital costs, operating, 
maintenance and monitoring costs. The growing importance of environmental quality, combined 
with the increase in the number of claims associated with contaminated site clean-ups has also 
provided an impetus for institutions, such as the Securities Exchange Commission (SEC), banks, 
insurance companies, and accounting firms to require firms to disclose their environmental 
                                                          
2 The EPA assesses hazardous wastes sites and uses a set of criteria to place the sites that are a potential threat to 
human health and the environment on the National Priorities List. 
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liabilities and costs (Harper and Adams, 1997).3 Within this context, previous studies have 
estimated economic benefits and impacts of the Superfund program and have determined that 
compliance with the Superfund legislation can result in improvements of public welfare (Green-
stone and Gallagher, 2005) as well as affect corporate earnings, ability to obtain a loan, and 
consequently affect investment activities (Lawrence and Khurana, 1997; Walden and Schwartz, 
1997).   
A less commonly used measure for environmental regulation stringency is the number of 
regulatory inspections of a firm. This measure of environmental regulation has been applied in 
county-level and state-level studies (Anton et al., 2004).  If a firm that has been subjected to a 
higher number of inspections in the past faces a greater chance of receiving penalties, then it is 
more likely to adopt measures that reduce compliance costs. Brunnermeier and Cohen (2003) 
point out that increased monitoring activities may result in the loss of reputation of the polluting 
firm as well as loss of contracts.  
2.1.3 Pollution Abatement Costs and Expenditures 
Many state-level empirical studies have used pollution abatement costs and expenditures 
(PACE) as a proxy for environmental regulation stringency. The PACE survey covers data on 
U.S. manufacturing, mining, and electric facilities‟ costs of complying with environmental 
regulations, including operating and capital expenditures for air, water, and solid waste pollution 
abatement efforts.  It is conducted jointly by the U.S. Census Bureau and the EPA.  Studies that 
have used PACE as a measure of environmental regulation stringency have focused on a wide 
array of issues, and results from these studies generally indicate that pollution abatement costs 
                                                          
3 The Emergency Planning and Right-to-Know Act enacted in 1986 mandated all manufacturing facilities in the U.S. 
to disclose to the public their release of all toxic chemicals in air, water, and land. Arguably, the environmental 
disclosure Act has provided an impetus for some companies to improve environmental performance in order to 
improve their corporate image as well as avoid liabilities, and consumer boycotts.  
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negatively affect industry productivity. Duffy-Deno (1992) examines the impact of PACE on 
manufacturing employment and earnings in the United States and shows that PACE has a 
negative effect on manufacturing employment and earnings. Gray and Shadbegian (1993) also 
use PACE as a measure of environmental regulation and their results show that PACE is 
negatively related to total factor productivity and to the growth rate. These research findings 
corroborate results from other studies that find that PACE negatively affects economic 
production (Barber and McConnell, 1986; Denison, 1979). 
2.1.4 Environmental Indexes 
In addition to direct costs of complying with environmental regulation, a variety of 
indexes representing state environmental regulation stringency has been used to measure 
environmental regulation stringency. Two of the most widely used environmental regulation 
indexes are the FREE index and Green index. The Fund for Renewable Energy Environment 
(1987) developed the FREE index that indicates U.S. states‟ strength of environmental regulation 
programs on air quality regulation, hazardous waste, and groundwater pollution. The FREE 
index measures the number of monitoring stations in a state and the number of enforcement 
actions initiated by a state (Potoski, 2002).  Hall and Kerr (1989) developed the Green index 
which is based on 256 measures of state environmental standards and public policy. The Green 
index includes an air quality index, water quality index, and toxic index. Other indexes less 
commonly used include the Southern Studies index and the League of Conservation Voters index 
(LCV). Sanyal (2007) used the LCV to capture political attitude towards environmental issues. 
The LCV keeps track of state senators‟ and congressmen‟s votes on environmental issues 
ranging from global warming, biodiversity loss to wetland conservations. It assigns a value to 
each pro-environment vote.  
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For the purpose of this study, county attainment status of the federal air quality standards 
will be used as a proxy for environmental regulation stringency. Attainment status of a county is 
an appealing proxy for environmental regulation stringency because air quality problems result 
from several stationary pollution sources including power plants, factories, farming, heating of 
buildings, as well as cars, buses, and other mobile sources. Together, these sources represent 
production and consumption activities that contribute to environmental degradation. It can also 
be argued that county attainment status is an appropriate measure for environmental regulation 
stringency because its enforcement is felt by the county‟s households and firms; therefore, the 
analysis of such impacts must be made at county-level (Greenstone, 2002; Jeppesen et al. 2002; 
List et al. 2003).  
2.2 Supply of and Demand for Environmental Regulations 
Welfare economics shows that without any form of regulation society will not allocate 
resources optimally because of market failure. Market failure manifests itself in forms such as 
sub-optimal air pollution, water quality degradation, and land degradation that impose unreim-
bursed costs on people and firms not responsible for the pollution. Typically, when production of 
a good generates significant negative externalities, profit maximizing firms in a competitive 
market supply too much of that good. Consumers benefit from lower prices and consume more 
of the good than is socially optimal. This occurs because the externalities are not accounted for 
in the cost of production and consumption. Therefore, the principal rationale for the supply of 
environmental regulation is market failure (Swanson, 2008). Environmental regulation is 
therefore supplied proactively, placing constraints on the use of resources and providing the basis 
for sustainable economic development (Swanson, 2008).  
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According to the political economy literature, the supply side of environmental regulation 
consists of appointed bureaucrats and elected politicians (Hacket, 2001; Schluga, 2004). Political 
forces are assumed to be crucial in influencing economic behavior of individuals, firms, and 
markets. The bureaucrats‟ role is to design environmental regulation that is fair, efficient, and 
compatible with the existing institutional framework. Institutional structure relates to issues such 
as party control, seniority, the role of committees and committee chairs, voting rules, and other 
aspects of procedure that have impacts on legislative and administrative outcomes (Hacket, 
2001).  
Environmental regulation imposes constraints on the use of a resource by polluters. This 
creates a shadow price for the resource‟s use and stimulates technological innovation. Politicians, 
on the other hand, enact (supply) regulations that are appealing to their constituents, while also 
accommodating interest groups (Schluga, 2004). The assumption is that politicians, like other 
economic agents, are motivated by incentives such as ideology, economic prosperity, reelection, 
and power when selecting policies that best serve the public (Hacket, 2001). Politicians try to 
supply environmental regulations that satisfy the interest groups in order to maximize their 
chance of electoral success (Fredriksson and Millimet, 2001). 
Because environmental regulation stimulates technological innovation, regulatory out-
comes also depend on the expected costs of pollution control, which are a function of current and 
future costs (Schluga, 2004). Thus, another important determinant of the supply of environ-
mental regulation is induced innovation, which forms the basis for improved productivity and 
competitiveness.  
The demand for environmental regulations originates from individuals and firms (Hacket, 
2001). As perceived health risks or damage to the environment increase, demand for environ-
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mental regulation increases because individuals react to prevent a significant reduction in their 
welfare.  
Firms that are negatively affected by environmental regulation may organize themselves 
in trade associations and lobby for lower environmental standards (Hackett, 1995). Strict 
environmental regulation often also results in the loss of jobs. Consequently, workers in 
polluting industries may also oppose tougher standards. However, other firms may demand 
restrictive environmental regulation because it creates a new market for their products or services 
while erecting entry barriers for potential new entrants (Schluga, 2004).  
Kahn (2008) examines the determinants of environmental regulations and finds that 
demographic factors such as educational attainment, income, age, population, and race 
significantly influence the demand for environmental regulations in the United States. Higher 
levels of education mean that people are better informed about environmental risks and this may 
increase demand for environmental regulation. 
Using the Green index as a measure of environmental regulation stringency, Hay et al. 
(1996) examine factors that influence environmental policymaking. They use six factors to 
capture the demand side of environmental regulation: environmental conditions, economic 
resources, state pressure, political ideology, institutional characteristics and federal activity. State 
pressure is represented by state membership in environmental groups and percentage of 
employees in the manufacturing sector. Hay et al. find that membership in environmental groups, 
percentage of employees in manufacturing, and political ideology are positively associated with 
environmental regulation stringency.  
Fredriksson and Millimet (2001) analyze the determinants of environmental policy- 
making in the 48 contiguous U.S. states. Their primary research objective is to examine if there 
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is a “California effect” when U.S. states adopt environmental policies.4 Fredriksson and Millimet 
posit that environmental policymaking in one state is affected by the environmental standards in 
neighboring states, as well as other factors such as per capita income, population, population 
density, and urbanization. In their estimation, they recognize that environmental regulation 
stringency can be endogenously determined with other factors. To circumvent the endogeneity 
problem, they use instrumental variable estimation. Fredriksson and Millimet find that abatement 
expenditures in one state are influenced by abatement expenditure in the neighboring state and 
that California has a marginal leadership role in other states‟ automobile emission standards.  
This is consistent with previous research on strategic environmental policymaking that indicates 
that the level of environmental regulation stringency in one jurisdiction will impact the level in 
neighboring jurisdictions.5  
2.3 Environmental Regulation and Economic Performance 
Since its inception, the EPA has been concerned about the effects of environmental 
regulation on promoting opportunities for economic and industrial growth (APOGEE, 1991). To 
that end, the EPA has conducted economic-impact analyses to determine the impact of 
environmental regulation enforcement on society and regulated industries. The EPA concluded 
that environmental regulation has impacts at the community-level, facility or industry-level, 
company-level, and market-level (EPA, 1999). The EPA recognizes that regulatory compliance 
costs are incorporated into the production decisions of polluting firms, and this raises the cost of 
                                                          
4 Vogel (1995) provide anecdotal evidence that indicate that California‟s high automobile emission standards 
influence emission standards adopted by other states in the U.S. He refers to this phenomenon as the „California 
effect.‟ In general, California effect refers to a situation in which environmental regulations adopted by one 
jurisdiction are adopted by other jurisdictions. 
5 Fredriksson and Millimet (2001) develop a model of yardstick competition that shows that California‟s 
environmental standards have an impact on other U.S. states‟ environmental decisions. Additional insights on 
strategic environmental policymaking are found in Wilson (1996) who provides a succinct survey of the literature.  
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production. These effects cause an upward shift in the supply function of the regulated firms; an 
upward shift in the supply function represents an additional cost per unit of output. The 
interactions between changes in supply and demand will result in a new equilibrium price and 
quantity. Therefore, in the aggregate environmental regulation stringency impacts employment, 
profit, facility closures, and tax revenue. 
Over the last 30 years economists have developed and applied various tools to understand 
the determinants of state economic growth and how regulatory policies (both economic and 
environmental policies) influence economic outcomes. Researchers analyzing the impact of 
environmental regulation stringency have used techniques such as survey methods, general 
equilibrium models, partial equilibrium models, and the social accounting matrix approach.  
Denison (1979) is one of the pioneers to study the relationship between environmental 
regulations and economic performance. Denison uses a growth accounting model to analyze the 
impact of environmental policies on U.S. economic growth. The results show that environmental 
compliance costs are responsible for a productivity loss of 13-20% over the period 1976-1978. In 
a related study, Jorgenson and Wilcoxen (1990) use a general equilibrium macro-model to 
quantify the impacts of environmental regulation stringency. Their model includes a long-term 
growth component with and without environmental regulations. They find that in an economy 
without environmental regulations the capital stock would be 3.792% higher and GNP would be 
2.5% higher. Like Denison, Jorgenson and Wilcoxen find that mandated investments in pollution 
control equipment negatively affect GDP growth.  
While many studies have shown that environmental regulation enforcements affect the 
marginal production cost, other studies have attempted to explain the economy-wide impacts of 
environmental regulations. Lieu (1991) utilizes a REMI model to understand economic and 
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demographic impacts of complying with the South Coast Air Quality Management Rule 
(SCAQMD) applied to electric utilities in Southern California. The REMI model consists of 53 
industries, 94 occupations, and 25 final demand sectors. He builds the model based on the 
assumption that producers and consumers in all regions of the country have similar behavioral 
characteristics. Simulation results for the 53 sector REMI model indicate that complying with 
SCAQMD increases the cost of doing business for affected facilities. Lieu asserts that affected 
firms may hike electricity rates in order to recover the increased control expenditures.  He also 
finds that, on average, job growth is slowed and this translates into slower population growth. 
Theoretically, the rise in the electricity price causes the substitution of labor and capital for fuel 
in production. In effect, this increases demand for labor and capital and generates upward 
pressure on the wage rate and the cost of capital.  
Harrison and Dreyfus (1995) quantify the socioeconomic impacts of proposed 
environmental regulations on electric utilities in Minnesota. Their study links the treatment of 
environmental externalities from utilities to statewide socioeconomic effects. They find that any 
attempt to increase regulations on utilities negatively affects growth in employment, population, 
personal income, and other economic indicators. This is due to the fact that efforts by utilities to 
internalize externalities result in increased production costs. Ultimately, part of the economic 
burden is transferred to consumers. Harrison (2008) suggests that complying with the NAAQS 
increases the financial burden of businesses and results in lower regional gross domestic product; 
loss of jobs; reduction in population; and loss of tax revenue. 
Other studies adopt a different perspective and examine the impact of pollution on 
productivity and learning ability. Margulis (1992) examines the impacts of air quality on the 
economy of Mexico City and argues that air pollution, particularly particulate matter and ozone 
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concentration negatively affect a person‟s productivity and learning ability. He finds that parti-
culate matter is the most damaging pollutant in Mexico City and causes significant economic 
losses through increased mortality, workday losses, and reduced productivity. He estimates that 
the annual cost of particulates in the air is $850 million and the related health costs $1.1 billion. 
Margulis‟ findings are consistent with a growing body of work that links air pollution to chronic 
and acute health problems and premature death (e.g., Ostro, 1983; Wadell, 1974). 
The influence of environmental regulation stringency on firm location decisions has also 
received considerable attention. To some extent, this has been precipitated by increased interstate 
economic competition. Condliffe and Morgan (2009) examine the impact of county-level 
attainment status (as a proxy for environmental regulation stringency) on plant births of polluting 
manufacturing firms. Their results indicate that stringent environmental regulation impacts 
pollution-intensive capital flows by deterring new plant births and conclude that this affects 
economic growth. More generally, they find that the impact of stricter environmental regulation 
varies by pollution intensity of manufacturers.  
Similarly, List and McHone (2000) examine the effects of air quality regulation on the 
location decisions of pollution-intensive manufacturing plants in New York counties. They find 
that enforcement of the federal air quality standards has a significant effect on location decisions 
of new pollution-intensive plants. Their results also indicate that capital flows were diverted to 
counties with less stringent environmental regulation, a finding that supports the “race to the 
bottom” hypothesis.  
In spite of anecdotal evidence supporting the race to the bottom hypothesis, some 
economists are critical of its validity (e.g., Millimet and List, 2003; Potoski, 2002). They 
conclude that environmental regulation stringency has no impact on firm location decisions and 
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productivity. Dean, Brown, and Stango (1999) examine the impact of environmental regulation 
stringency on the formation of manufacturing establishments and find no effect on the establish-
ment of large manufacturing firms. However, regulation discourages smaller manufacturing 
establishments from locating in areas with stringent regulations.  
2.4 Determinants of Regional Growth  
Because of the importance of state and local governments in structuring and financing 
economic development it is critical for policymaker to understand the factors that explain 
differences in states‟ economic growth. As Kale (1984, p. 31) observes, “the concern over state 
development incentives will probably intensify, both regionally and nationally as the federal 
government cuts taxes and the states are left to shoulder an increasing tax burden.” These 
sentiments reflect the challenges that state policymakers continue to face while trying to find 
ways of stimulating regional growth and development. Within this context, regional economists 
have determined that public policy, human capital, political factors, wages, environmental 
quality, industrial mix, amenities, including other socio-economic indicators play an integral role 
in regional growth and development.  
Previous studies have measured growth and development using population, total 
employment, personal income, per capita income, and gross state product (Goetz, 1996; Barro 
and Sala-i-Martin, 1991; Carlino and Mills, 1987; Deller et al., 2001). At the regional level, a 
number of studies use simultaneous equations models to empirically test the “people follow jobs 
and jobs follow people” hypothesis. Another dimension added to these growth studies is the 
recognition that space plays a significant role in the variations among regional economies. 
Because of this, spatial econometric models have been adopted to explain regional growth 
disparities and dependencies across jurisdictions.  
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Lundberg (2004) tests the hypothesis that the average income growth rate and net 
migration rate in one municipality lead to spillovers that affect the growth rates of neighboring 
municipalities. Lundberg finds a positive correlation between net migration rates in neighboring 
municipalities, suggesting that there is a spillover effect across neighboring municipalities. 
Likewise, Lundberg finds that an increase in the average income level in one municipality spills 
over into jurisdictions and affects their average income growth rates.6  
Kunce (2006) employs panel estimation techniques to analyze the factors that influence 
growth in state manufacturing employment in the U.S. for the period 1974-1994. The model 
includes five key policy variables as explanatory variables: highway miles, union membership, 
pollution abatement expenditures, tax effort, and right to work. Recognizing that pollution 
control costs can be determined endogenously with firm location patterns, Kunce splits the data 
into five periods. While some policy variables reveal counter-intuitive results, the overall results 
show that pollution control expenditures, the state‟s tax effort, and union membership negatively 
affect employment growth. In addition, Kunce‟s results show that a state‟s infrastructure and 
right-to-work laws positively influence employment growth. 
Plaut and Pluta (1983) examine the relationship between business climate and industrial 
growth. They argue that a good business climate is characterized by low state and local taxes, 
right to work, little union activity, and a cooperative governmental structure. They specify a 
three equation model for industrial growth represented by change in real value added, change in 
employment, and change in capital stock and use various explanatory variables that include 
climatic conditions. They find that tax effort, hot-humid weather, union activity and cost of land 
are negatively related to growth in real value-added, employment, and capital stock, while 
                                                          
6 Numerous studies have emphasized the importance of strategic policymaking. For example, Case, Hines, and 
Rosen (1993) show that a state government‟s spending is positively influenced by expenditure levels of its neighbor 
while Brueckner (2000) discusses the role of strategic competition in relation to welfare benefits across jurisdictions.   
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unemployment rates positively influence growth in employment and value-added. Plaut and 
Pluta also find that property taxes, wage rate, total education expenditure, cost and availability of 
land are positively related to growth in value-added, employment, and capital stock. In addition, 
their study shows that labor-related and climate factors are important determinants of state output 
and employment growth. 
Goetz et al. (1996) develop an income growth model of the 50 U.S. states that includes 
state environmental regulations, initial levels of income, environmental quality, education, per-
cent of jobs in nine sectors, and poverty rate. Goetz et al. find that there is convergence in 
income as revealed by the negative coefficient on initial income. On the other hand, the impact 
of education on income growth reveals a counter-intuitive effect, indicated by the negative 
coefficient for education. Other results show that state environmental regulations and environ-
mental quality have a positive effect on income growth. The percent of jobs in each of the nine 
sectors markedly shows different impacts on income growth, with construction, manufacturing, 
transportation, fire, and service sectors having a positive relationship with income growth. This 
can be explained by the fact that these sectors are high paying and account for a large share of 
employment in some parts of the U.S. The study also concludes that strict environmental 
regulations impose costs on polluting facilities, which in the short-run negatively affect 
economic growth, but in the long-run have a positive effect thanks to improved environmental 
quality.  
A recent research by Mojica (2009) is related to the general economic development 
problem of the Appalachian region. She uses a regional growth model to analyze the impact of 
entrepreneurship on economic growth, but her model does not take into account spatial spill-
overs. The model implicitly tests for convergence by including initial conditions of the depen-
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dent variables as explanatory variables. Mojica measures entrepreneurship using proprietorship 
and firm births and deaths data. Results from the population equation show that employment 
growth, firm birth, and entrepreneurship positively affect population growth while firm deaths 
shows a negative relationship. Similar to Carlino and Mills (1987) and Deller et al. (2001), 
Mojica finds that employment growth is positively influenced by population growth and per 
capita income growth. This suggests that income, population, and employment play an important 
role in regional growth. Mojica‟s results also show that population growth and firm death 
negatively affects per capita income growth.   
Gebremariam et al. (2007) utilize a non-spatial and spatial growth equilibrium model to 
analyze the interdependences among employment growth, in-migration, out-migration, local 
public expenditures, and median household income for 410 Appalachian counties. The five 
dependent variables are regressed against a vector of independent variables and the initial 
conditions of the dependent variable. Gebremariam et al. find that income growth positively 
influences employment growth, but is negatively related to initial conditions of employment. 
Accordingly, an increase in income creates wealth and this leads to increased consumer demand 
for goods and services, which in turn stimulates formation of small businesses. He also finds that 
the proportion of population employed in manufacturing and the per capita income tax are 
negatively related to small business employment growth. Other results show that growth rate of 
in-migration strongly depends on employment growth rate, median household income, and direct 
local expenditures. This supports the hypothesis that counties which are experiencing growth in 
employment and incomes will have more in-migration. Results also indicate that there is 
convergence in out-migration growth rate and that employment growth rate positively affects 
income growth, while in-migration is negatively related to income growth.  
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Li (2006) utilizes a regional growth equilibrium model to analyze the impact of 
environmental regulations and economic policies on population and employment growth in U.S. 
counties. Li employs a non-spatial and spatial simultaneous regional growth model that includes 
various explanatory variables such as population density, amenity index, regional dummies, air 
quality, manufacturing concentration, fiscal variables, taxes, human capital, and other relevant 
regional variables. Li determines that environmental regulations and economic policies are 
endogenous in the employment equation. Therefore, to circumvent simultaneity bias Li utilizes 
instrumental variables. Results reveal that population growth has a positive effect on 
employment growth and vice versa, supporting the hypothesis that people follow jobs and jobs 
follow people. Li‟s spatial model reveals that local environmental policies have a positive effect 
on employment growth in metro counties and a negative effect on population growth, while 
economic development policies have no effect on employment growth. Like previous studies, Li 
finds that high crime rate, population density and per capita income tax retard population growth.  
Using panel data, Helms (1985) investigates the effect of state and local taxes on 
economic growth. He specifies a single equation model where economic growth is measured by 
state personal income. Helms find that taxes have different effects on business activity depending 
on how tax revenues are spent. He contends that if the tax revenues are used to redistribute 
income, economic growth will be negatively affected, while if taxes are used to improve public 
capital and human capital, taxes will be positively related to economic growth.  
Helms‟ finding of the importance of infrastructure investment in economic growth is 
supported by Jones‟ (1990) work. Jones examines economic growth in relation to state‟s public 
spending policies on education, highways, welfare, police and fire services, and health/ hospitals. 
He finds that spending on welfare and health/hospital negatively affects economic growth while 
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spending on police/fire services, education, and highways positively influences economic 
growth. These results are consistent with the theory that infrastructure development policies can 
be effectively used to stimulate economic development. Munnell (1990) has done similar work 
on the impact of public infrastructure on the productivity. Munnell finds a statistically significant 
positive relationship between public capital investment and the level of labor productivity. 
Munnell also finds that public capital positively influences employment growth and explains that 
public investment in roads enables private companies to produce their goods at a lower cost.  
Pagoulatos et al. (2002) use a three equation disequilibrium adjustment model to explore 
the interactions among changes in employment, earnings per worker, and pollution per square 
mile for 3,036 U.S. counties. They find that counties with high initial levels of employment, 
pollution per square mile, and per worker earnings correspondingly experienced lower 
employment, pollution, and earnings growth. In addition, their results reveal that employment 
growth is deterred by union involvement, high energy and land costs. Not surprisingly, counties 
with higher pollution levels are found to experience slower employment growth but faster 
growth in earnings per worker. This reinforces the notion that workers residing in highly polluted 
counties will demand higher wages. In addition, this finding counters the theory which suggests 
that employment growth is associated with high pollution. By and large, the findings of 
Pagoulatos et al. support the hypothesis that better environmental quality is associated with 
higher employment growths. A growing number of empirical studies emphasize that environ-
mental quality and amenity attributes play important roles in growth and development.  
Evidence of the importance of environmental quality comes from Tannenwald (1997) 
who asserts that the central objective of environmental regulations is to promote economic 
welfare through the internalization of externalities. Tannenwald adds that internalization of the 
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externalities can enhance a jurisdiction‟s attractiveness as a place to live, work, vacation, and 
establish businesses. As such, workers and executives may be willing to sacrifice for monetary 
compensation in order to work and live in communities that have better air quality. To that end, 
Tannenwald explains that a jurisdiction‟s dirty air can stunt economic growth in two basic ways. 
In the first place, a jurisdiction‟s dirty air will make the area to be unattractive to workers, 
thereby constrain labor supply and thus drive labor costs up. All else equal, profit maximizing 
firms and utility maximizing individuals migrate to an area with better environmental quality and 
this increases the labor supply and places downward pressure on wages. Secondly, the 
jurisdiction‟s dirty air precipitates more stringent regulation, thereby increasing environmental 
compliance costs for existing and new firms. However, considering that environmental regula-
tions are more stringent on new plants, this will deter new plant establishment and thus retard 
economic growth.   
McGranahan (1999) develops an amenity index and relates it to employment growth. He 
finds that for a period of 25 years employment growth is positively related to the natural amenity 
index. By and large, McGranahan finds that high amenity counties have three times as many jobs 
than low amenity counties. Like McGranahan, Deller et al. (2001) find five amenity attributes 
that are positively related to economic growth. Deller et al. find that climate related attributes 
strongly influence population, employment, and per capita income growth.  
Along Similar lines, Kahsai (2009) utilizes a Spatial Durbin Model to analyze the 
relationship between regional growth and amenity factors for counties in the northeast region of 
the U.S. He uses a three-equation simultaneous growth model to account for the feedbacks 
among income density, population density, and employment density. Kahsai employs various 
measures of amenities, including other exogenous factors to explain changes in employment 
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density, per capita income density, and population density. Results from the non-spatial model 
indicate that amenity factors positively influence population growth. Kahsai finds that only land-
based and water-based amenities positively influence employment growth and per capita income 
growth, respectively. Kahsai‟s spatial analyses complement findings by Hailu (2006) by showing 
that county employment growth is not only affected by own-county socio-economic factors, but 
also by those of neighboring counties. These findings underscore the importance of utilizing 
spatial models that take into account interdependences among spatial units in order to explain the 
impacts of neighborhood characteristics on the variations in regional growth.  
Building on Krugman‟s (1991) model, Hosoe and Naito (2006) examine the impact of 
environmental damage on the urban structure using an economic geography model of two 
regions. In this model, they show that agglomeration economies affect the productivity of other 
sectors via water pollution and air pollution. They argue that equilibrium distribution of 
population in one region relative to another depends on the pattern of environmental damage. To 
test this hypothesis, they consider a situation where there is transboundary pollution between two 
regions. In their analysis, an environmental tax is imposed on manufactured goods produced in 
one region, while the other region does not control for pollution. Their findings show that the tax 
policy leads to a decrease in population in the region without environmental controls because the 
region with environmental controls results in improved environmental standard.  The findings by 
Hosoe and Naito are consistent with studies that have shown that environmental quality has a 
direct impact on population migration.  
A study by Templet (1995) analyzes the relationship between risky environmental condi-
tions (such as presence of high pollution-intensive plants) and economic performance in U.S. 
states. Templet finds a negative relationship between environmental risks and economic 
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performance. The results reveal that states with a large number of pollution-intensive plants 
exhibit greater poverty, higher unemployment, lower retail sales growth, greater number of 
business failures, and lower personal income. This means that neighborhood characteristics 
influenced environmental outcomes. 
In summary, the last 30 years produced many studies providing insights in the factors 
underlying differences in regional growth. Findings overwhelmingly show that education, 
infrastructure investment, industry mix, taxes, environmental characteristics, amenity attributes, 
including state economic policies play an integral role in economic development. Therefore, 
inclusion of policy variables like environmental regulations in regional growth models is highly 
relevant in order to determine economic outcomes. Unfortunately, growth effects of local 
economic and environmental regulation policies have not been examined in a manner which 
takes into account all the feedback effects. In this regard, no empirical effort has been rendered 
to examine the interdependences among employment, income, population, and environmental 
regulations in a simultaneous framework.  
This study resolves the issue regarding endogeneity bias discussed in the introduction to 
this chapter by utilizing a regional growth model that takes into account the feedback 
relationship among environmental regulation stringency, income, population, and employment 
changes. In addition, many of the previous studies on the environmental regulations-economic 
growth relationship have been done at state level, consequently failing to capture the 
heterogeneity at local levels. This study fills that gap by conducting the empirical analysis at the 
county-level. 
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CHAPTER 3 
THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
3.0 Introduction 
Interactions between economic growth and the environment have been modeled using 
growth models which typically view the environment as an input in the production function and 
which explore the relationship between economic growth and environmental quality (Smulders, 
2000; Aghion and Howitt, 1998). Broadly, these studies show that economic growth and the 
environment interact in a number of ways. In the first place, the environment provides the basic 
inputs for production and consumption and this subsequently leads to economic growth. 
Secondly, the environment will act as a sink for wastes generated from economic activities of 
production and consumption—thereby intensifying the problem of environmental degradation. 
For instance, air pollution emanating from sources such as transportation systems, production 
activities, and so forth, will arguably affect society‟s economic and social welfare.  
Viewed in this manner, the degradation of the environment lowers the utility of 
consumers as well as diminishing the productivity of factors. Hence, because of the amenity and 
productive values associated with the environment, this may result in society‟s preference for a 
clean environment (Smulders, 2000). Conceptually, environmental quality cannot be sustained 
without any form of intervention. Within the framework of endogenous growth theory, long-run 
growth rates are affected by government policies such as taxation and regulation (Xepapadeas, 
2000). As a consequence, a modern approach to endogenous growth theory suggests that sound 
environmental standards promote economic and social welfare by correcting for externalities 
generated from production and consumption activities. Another recurrent theme in the 
endogenous growth theory is that environmental regulations provide a strong stimulus for 
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technological progress and stress that technological progress is the engine to economic growth 
(Romer, 1990). The argument is that investments in physical capital and other man-made 
productions play important roles in expanding the available factors of production, and to the 
subsequent growth in output.  
3.1 Short-Run and Long-Run Impacts of Environmental Regulations  
To formalize the environmental regulations-economic growth relationship, particularly 
how environmental regulations affect economic growth in the short-run and long-run, let us 
assume that a representative manufacturing firm in the economy uses a Cobb-Douglas 
technology to produce aggregate output . The production function uses productive capital stock 
, effective labor  and an aggregate of raw materials  , as inputs. Formally, the production 
function is specified as: 
(3.1)   
Labor and capital are assumed to be substitutable while technological change is endogenous and 
there are constant returns to scale. Other assumptions made are that the inputs contribute non-
negatively to production:  ,    
Arrow et al. (1995) point out that the flow of emissions per time unit is related to production 
output, hence the environmental quality function is specified as: 
(3.2)   
In equation (3.2),  denotes the unit emissions coefficient, or simply emissions per unit of 
output, and  is environmental quality. In this formulation, emission reduction technologies are 
not incorporated and thus, it can be deduced that environmental quality  is decreasing in  and 
. This means that increases in the use of production technology as well as use of raw 
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materials  lead to changes in output and environmental quality. This raises the question whether 
a tradeoff exists between environmental quality and economic growth. 
To examine the possible tradeoff between environmental quality and economic growth, 
the concept of the transformation frontier suggested by Crissman et al. (1997, p. 27) is adopted. 
Crissman et al. use the transformation frontier concept to show how government intervention 
through environmental policies and adoption of abatement technologies affects the relationship 
between agricultural production output and environmental quality. Figure 3.1 presents the 
tradeoff curve that captures the relationship between manufacturing production,  and 
environmental quality, . 
Following the specifications of the production function in equation (3.1),  in figure 3.1 
represents the production technology that does not incorporate pollution abatement efforts, which 
produces  units of output—with a corresponding air quality standard (or environmental 
quality) of . In the short run,  is fixed and thus the only variable inputs used in production 
are labor and raw materials. This means that an increase in the use of raw materials, , will result 
in more output and more pollution, or equivalently a decline in environmental quality. According 
to figure 3.1, production of will result in emission of pollutants which exceed the federal air 
quality standards, and this will lead to an areas‟ designation of the non-attainment status.  
One way of preventing accumulation of ambient pollution levels in this model is to allow 
for adoption of cleaner technologies that have the ability to enhance productivity and reduce 
pollution. Within this context, imposition of a restrictive environmental policy will compel 
polluting firms to adopt abatement technologies which decrease the flow of emissions (or 
improve environmental quality). Assuming that  is the pollution abatement technology 
adopted by the polluting firm, figure 3.1 shows that the short-run effect of environmental 
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regulations is an improvement in environmental quality and reduced output. In the short-run, 
output falls from  to , while environmental quality increases from to . 
Theoretically, this means that firms in the short-run will incur higher production costs due to 
investments in abatement technologies, and accordingly, the diversion of resources from 
production and investment activities will lead to slower economic growth. The reduced output 
( ) represents the opportunity cost of environmental regulations that result in improved 
environmental quality relative to forgone output.   
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.1: Tradeoff Relationship Between Environmental Quality and Manufacturing Output 
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In the medium-term and long-term, firms invest in other productive technologies as well 
as in human capital that effectively augment output from  to  and improves environmental 
quality from  to . Within this context, technological progress enables firms to lower 
the marginal cost of pollution control, and this allows firms to produce more with less pollution. 
Figure 3.1 shows that in the long-run, adoption of abatement technologies by firms makes it 
possible that a region‟s air quality is in compliance with the federal air quality standards−leads to 
the attainment status ( )−and still allows firms to increase output from  to .  
The above model shows that economic growth and environmental quality can be 
reconciled by allowing for technological progress. This view is supported by endogenous growth 
theories which posit that environmental regulations generate external effects which enhance 
productivity and long-run growth (Barro, 1999; Romer, 1990). Similarly, Porter and van der 
Linde (1995) argue that additional constraints placed on firms in the form of environmental 
regulations can induce technological innovations that are capable of expanding production 
possibilities. In this case, investments in pollution abatement technologies will lead to 
environmental improvements inasmuch as enhance productivity of factors of production, and 
thus lead to economic growth.  
Because environmental policy imposes additional costs, profit-maximizing firms devote 
more resources to R&D in order to be more competitive. R&D activities result in more 
innovations in the form of new production methods, new products, and so forth (Romer, 1987; 
Smulders and Gradus, 1996). Insights from endogenous growth theory also indicate that the 
accumulation of knowledge plays an integral role in stimulating economic growth by offsetting 
diminishing returns (Grossman and Helpman, 1991). Smulders (1995) suggests that growth is 
sustainable only if abatement has a knowledge dimension which allows for growth in production 
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with constant pollution. Like Smulders, Barro (1999) explains that the engine of growth is the 
accumulation of knowledge as this leads to R&D activities. Under these circumstances, 
environmental regulations that encourage new technological development could improve 
efficiency.  
3.2 Environmental Quality and Economic Growth 
The graphical analysis in the preceding section illustrates tradeoffs between environ-
mental quality and economic growth and emphasizes the importance of technological innovation 
in reconciling environmental quality with economic growth.  It also forms the basis for analyzing 
the role of environmental quality in economic growth. Applying the insights from section (3.2), 
we assume that, besides capital and labor, environmental quality plays an important role in 
economic growth. Against that background, the production function in equation (3.1) is re-
specified to include environmental quality, , effective labor , and capital stock  (productive 
capital  plus abatement technology ) as factors of production. In this case, the appropriate 
way of reducing emissions or improving environmental quality is to invest in two types of man-
made capital stocks: productive capital,  and abatement technology, . The production 
function is expressed as: 
(3.3) ; with . 
Differentiating equation (3.3) with respect to time, after re-arrangement, yields the rate of 
technological progress, : 
(3.4)  
According to equation (3.4) economic growth  depends on capital growth, labor, and 
environmental quality. Since environmental quality is an input in the production, it can be 
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inferred that productive capital  and abatement technology  jointly determine the 
environmental quality standard according to the following function:  With this 
definition, the change in environmental quality can thus be specified as a renewable resource 
given that it is affected by extraction of resources and production processes; however, 
environmental degradation can be mitigated by putting in place environmental standards that 
restrict extraction of resources and limits pollution from economic activities. Following 
Xepapadeas (2000), environmental quality will evolve according to: 
(3.5)  
 represents an environmental regeneration function and Z denotes reductions in environ-
mental quality due to emissions from economic activities. The regeneration function represents 
nature‟s capacity to absorb pollution and renew itself (Xepapadeas, 2000). Emissions, are a 
function of productive capital and abatement technology .  
Theoretically, without production emissions are zero and environmental quality 
is at its maximum. Thus, we can infer that the emissions function has the following properties: 
(3.6)  
Equation (3.6) shows that net emissions are increasing and convex in productive capital 
stock, , and decreasing and convex in abatement technology   The last equation indicates 
that a given unit of abatement may become more efficient the more polluting capital there is 
(Vogel, 1999). Ariga (2002) shows that the elasticities of environmental quality with respect to 
productive capital and abatement technology play an important role in determining the growth 
rate of the environment. For this reason, well-designed environmental regulations are presumed 
to encourage technological innovation, while poorly designed regulations can inhibit 
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technological progress (Porter and van der Linde, 1995). This is the premise of the Porter 
hypothesis.  
A clean environment means that an area is attractive to new businesses and in-migrants. 
In the long-run, this leads to economic growth. Goetz et al. (1996) assert that improved environ-
mental quality has an amenity value, and therefore, has a positive effect on per capita income; it 
also influences firms‟ and households‟ (workers) location decisions. If the health of workers 
improves there is a further boost in labor productivity. This kind of relationship is illustrated in 
figures 3.2 and 3.3, which captures the channels of transmission of environmental regulations to 
economic growth.  
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
  
Adapted from Goetz et al. 1996 
Figure 3.2 shows that the initial impact of environmental regulation is increased pro-
duction costs, which result from the initial shocks of environmental regulation implementation; 
this culminates into reduced production output as shown by the negative sign. However, since 
Figure 3.2: Relationship between Environmental Conditions and Economic Growth 
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environmental quality can evolve as a renewable resource in the form shown in equation (3.1), 
we deduce that investments in the environment in the form of abatement technology enhance the 
absorption capacity of the environment   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Modified version of Goetz et al. (1996) 
As illustrated in figure 3.3, the long-run gain of environmental regulation is reduced pro-
duction cost for regulated firms and improved environmental quality. These effects have 
multiplier effects in terms of attracting new firms, skilled workers, and wealthy retirees. In the 
long-run, this affects the living standards of households by increasing per capita income and 
improving the health of workers because of less exposure to environmental pollution. Therefore, 
government measures that are designed to reduce pollution through environmental regulations 
play a crucial role in promoting long-run economic growth.   
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Figure 3.3: Long-Run Relationship between Environmental Conditions and Economic Growth 
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3.3 Environmental Quality and Optimal Growth 
When discussing social optimization, it is apparent that environmental improvements will 
affect the behavior of households in terms of consumption, investment rates, and therefore, the 
pattern of economic growth. Assuming that a representative consumer derives utility from 
consumption of goods , and environmental quality,  an  individual‟s utility function can 
be specified as: 
(3.7)  
Following Aghion and Howitt (1998), the utility function in equation (3.7) comes from 
the family of isoelastic utility functions which reflect the case of perfect complementarity 
(without any substitution) between produced goods, , and environmental quality, . Formally, 
this type of utility function will take the following CES structure: 
(3.8)  
In the above formulation, utility from consumption and environmental quality is assigned the 
same weight ( and it is assumed that the utility function is strictly concave in 
consumption , and environmental quality  according to the following functions:  
(3.9) .  
The last property in equation (3.9) indicates that an improvement in environmental quality will 
increase the marginal utility of consumption, and vice versa.  
It was argued in the previous section that environmental improvements  will arise due to 
investment in abatement technology which reduces emissions, . This entails that the aggregate 
capital stock  consists of productive capital and abatement capital. Assuming that output   or 
is used for consumption, , and invested in abatement activities,  the capital 
accumulation function can be expressed as: 
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(3.10)  
Based on the utility function specified in equation (3.7), the social planner‟s problem is to choose 
time paths for  and  that maximize the intertemporal utility function according to:  
(3.11) subject to:  and , 
where  is the discount rate, is an indicator of environmental quality while represents the 
investment in man-made capital and abatement technology. The current value Hamiltonian is 
defined as: 
(3.12)  
 and   represent the co-state variables related to capital,  and environmental quality,  
With differentiation, the following first order conditions are obtained: 
(3.13)  
(3.14)  
(3.15)  
(3.16)  
Results in equation (3.13) show that the shadow price of environmental quality is equal to the 
abatement cost represented by  times the shadow price of capital,  whereas the 
conditions in equation (3.14) indicate that the shadow price of man-made capital is equal to the 
marginal utility of consumption. Equations (3.16) and (3.17) capture the benefits of capital 
investments and environmental improvements, respectively.  
Endogenous growth theory shows that investments in productive capital lead to increased 
productivity  and may also result in increased emissions. However, the 
abatement technology incorporated in the model offsets emissions from production and thus 
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results in environmental quality improvements. Environmental quality improvements in turn 
positively affect consumer utility. As shown by Smulders and Gradus (1996), when environ-
mental quality and consumption enter the utility function, balanced growth depends on two 
conditions. First, consumption levels (or utility) should be non-decreasing, and second, 
environmental quality should be increasing or improving. This also implies that the marginal 
increase in consumption and environmental quality will increase utility. Thus the social optimum 
entails that when environmental quality is used as input in the utility function, abatement 
activities have to be undertaken in order to enhance social welfare.  
It can be concluded that when environmental concerns are not addressed, long-term 
growth will result in deterioration of the environment, and thus growth will not be optimal. In 
this regard, increased output comes at the expense of reduced environmental quality; therefore, 
indicating the incompatibility between economic growth and environmental quality. However, 
this incompatibility can be ameliorated by imposition of environmental regulations which 
explicitly translate into increased cost of production for polluting firms, a decline in output (in 
the short-run) and improved environmental quality. In this manner, environmental quality 
improvements can be influenced by adopting environmental regulations or by restructuring 
production through the adoption of cleaner technologies. In accordance with endogenous growth 
theory, environmental quality enhances productivity of factors of production, and positively 
affects consumer welfare through the amenity and productive values; hence, in the long-run, 
economic growth will improve. Under these conditions, it seems possible that economic growth 
and environmental regulations can be compatible. 
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CHAPTER 4 
EMPIRICAL MODELS AND DATA DESCRIPTION 
4.0 Introduction 
Chapter three explored the theoretical relationships between economic growth and 
environmental regulations. It was established that without any form of intervention, economic 
activities can result in the degradation of environment and in turn affect productivity and social 
welfare. In accordance with the endogenous growth literature, it was established that well 
designed environmental regulations can be used to promote economic and social welfare by 
correcting for the externalities. Within the context of the environmental Kuznets curve literature, 
factors such as population density, income, industrial composition, and other socio-economic 
indicators can influence the level of environmental pollution. This argument implies that factors 
that influence the level of pollution also have a bearing on environmental regulation stringency. 
In addition, because of spatial variations in economic activities, different locations will supply 
different environmental regulations. From the concepts of utility and profit maximization, it is 
conceivable that consumers and firms respond to spatial variations in environmental regulation 
stringency, thereby resulting in different levels of population, employment, and income growth 
across regions. In other words, the economic development impacts of environmental regulation 
stringency will differ across sectors and jurisdictions.  
From the foregoing discussion, the regional development impacts of environmental 
regulations can be understood using regional growth models which emphasize the 
interdependences of household residential and firm location choices. The underlying assumption 
of these models is that jobs follow people and people follow jobs (Steinnes, 1982). The aim of 
this chapter, therefore, is to discuss the empirical regional growth models for conducting the 
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hypothesis tests outlined in chapter one and also to discuss the data types and sources. The rest of 
the chapter is organized in the following manner. Section 4.2 discusses models of regional 
economic growth, taking the form of non-spatial regional growth model while section 4.3 
extends the non-spatial model by introducing the Spatial Durbin Model (SDM). Section 4.4 
introduces a discussion on the data types and sources, including a discussion on the variables 
used in the equations and their expected signs. The last section (4.5) provides an overview of the 
estimation techniques to be used.  
4.1 Non-Spatial Regional Growth Model (Model 1) 
Since the development of causality models by Steinnes (1982) that tested whether jobs 
follow people or people follow jobs, models of regional development have been specified to 
reflect the interdependence between household residential choices and firm location decisions. 
Carlino and Mills (1987) modified Steinnes‟ model by constructing a two-equation non-spatial 
simultaneous model, which captured the interdependence between population and employment 
changes. Deller et al. (2001) extended the Carlino-Mills model by specifying a three equation 
simultaneous model which captured the interdependences among income, population and 
employment change.  
The premise of these regional growth models is that utility maximizing consumers 
migrate in search of utility derived from the consumption of market and non-market goods, and 
profit maximizing firms, on the other hand become mobile when looking for regions that have 
lower production costs and higher market demand. As discussed in the theoretical chapter 
(sections 3.3 and 3.4), the long-run gain of environmental regulation is improved environmental 
quality and this has multiplier effects in terms of attracting new firms and workers, improved 
productivity, increased income, and so forth. Within this framework, this study presumes that 
53 
 
interdependences exist between income, employment, population, and environmental regulation. 
Utility maximizing consumers and profit maximizing firms migrate to areas with better 
environmental quality, which are a result of increased environmental regulation. Within the 
neoclassical framework, households migrate in order to maximize their utility, and this migration 
can be stimulated by wage or income differentials, including variations in the provision of public 
goods and services.  
Thus, this study extends Deller et al.‟s model by specifying a four-equation simultaneous 
model. Like previous studies, it assumes that there is a lag-adjustment process between a change 
in one of the endogenous variables and the other endogenous variables. In a general equilibrium 
framework, population, employment, income, and environmental regulations are not only 
interdependent upon each other, but will also interact with exogenous factors, including the 
lagged values of the endogenous variables.  The general form of the four-equation simultaneous 
model representing the interactions among population (P), employment (E), income (Y), and 
environmental regulations (ER) is specified as: 
(4.1)  
(4.2)  
(4.3)  
(4.4)  
Where represent equilibrium levels of population, employment, per capita 
income, and environmental regulations, respectively in the  county;  
represent a set of exogenous variables that have either a direct or indirect effect on population, 
employment, income, and environmental regulations.  
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Equations (4.1) through (4.4) state that equilibrium levels of population, employment, 
income, and environmental regulations depend on actual population, employment, income, and 
environmental regulations, including other exogenous variables in s . The general equilibrium 
condition specified in equations (4.1) to (4.4) can be specified as a linear relationship in the 
following manner: 
(4.5)  
(4.6)  
(4.7)  
(4.8)  
It is assumed that endogenous variables are not fully adjusted and that the endogenous 
variables adjust to equilibrium levels with substantial lags (Mills and Price, 1984). Following 
this relationship, the distributed partial adjustment models for the equilibrium levels for 
population, employment, income, and environmental regulations are specified as: 
(4.9)  
(4.10)  
(4.11)  
(4.12)  
The subscript refers to the initial conditions of the endogenous variables, which in this 
case are the 1992 values; , , , and P E Y ER  represent the speed-of-adjustment coefficients to 
desired levels of population, employment, per capita income, and environmental regulation. 
Adjustment coefficients are assumed to be positive and between zero and one.  
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Equations (4.9) through (4.12) show that current employment, population, income, and 
environmental regulations are dependent on their initial conditions and on the change between 
equilibrium values and on its lagged values. After rearranging equations (4.9) to (4.12), we 
obtain population, employment, income, and environmental regulation changes as shown below.  
(4.13)  
(4.14)  
(4.15)  
(4.16) , 
where  represents the change in population, employment  income, and environmental 
regulations, respectively. The changes in the endogenous variables are derived from the 
difference between the 2007 observations and 1992 observations as shown below. 
(4.17)  
(4.18)  
(4.19)  
(4.20)  
Substituting equations (4.13) through (4.16) into the right-hand side of equations (4.5), (4.6), 
(4.7), and (4.8), respectively, adopting of linear forms, and replacing the right hand unobservable 
variables, this results in the econometric model to be estimated. Thus, the proposed non-spatial 
model to be estimated consists of a system of four simultaneous equations describing population, 
employment, per capita income, and environmental regulation changes, respectively. The non-
spatial four systems of equations are specified as: 
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(4.21) 
 
(4.22) 
 
(4.23) 
 
(4.24) 
 
The dependent variables ∆POP, ∆EMP, ∆Y, and ∆ER denote county changes in population, 
employment, per capita income, and environmental regulation, respectively; where 
 represent the structural error terms, and  is a vector of exogenous 
variables. The year 1992 is taken as the initial period (subscript t−1). As already discussed, the 
lag adjustment models assume that the endogenous variables do not adjust instantaneously to 
their equilibrium levels but rather over a period of time. Deller et al. (2001) point out that the 
speed of adjustment to equilibrium levels is embedded in the coefficients α, β, and δ. Therefore, 
equations (4.21) to (4.24) estimate the short-term adjustments of population, employment, 
income, and environmental regulations to their long-term equilibrium levels of (P*, E*, Y*, and 
ER
*). 
Millimet and Fredriksson (2002) show that state regulatory outcomes respond to 
regulatory decisions in other states. Implicit in this discussion is that the stringency of environ-
mental regulations in one jurisdiction is a function of the level of environmental regulations in 
another jurisdiction. Under these circumstances, it is probable that pollution levels in a given 
area will be influenced by pollution levels in a neighboring area due to the transboundary 
problem of pollution, and thus the stringency of county environmental regulations are likely to 
exhibit spatial dependence. In addition, LeSage and Fischer (2009), point out that spatial 
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dependence is a common phenomenon in regional growth analysis, particularly with regard to 
variables such as per capita income, population, and employment levels. Thus, the major 
shortcoming of the models outlined in equations (4.21) through (4.24) is the lack of consi-
deration of the cross-sectional spatial dependences, as environmental outcomes and growth 
outcomes in one county may be related to outcomes and activities in adjacent counties. 
Therefore, equations (4.21) through (4.24) need to take account of the spatial spillovers.  
4.2 Spatial Model of Regional Growth (Model 2) 
Despite the fact that the EPA has the overall responsibility for the implementation of U.S. 
air quality regulations, the CAA gave U.S. states the mandate to implement and enforce federal 
air quality regulations. Accordingly, each state is required to develop a state implementation plan 
(SIP) outlining how federal air quality standards are going to be achieved. As consequence, it is 
conceivable that the state‟s discretion in developing implementation plans will inevitably result 
in differences in environmental stringency across the U.S. states. The concern with this 
decentralized approach is that when states are faced with intense interstate economic 
competition, states have the incentive to relax environmental regulations in order to attract 
capital investment (Engel, 1997; Konisky, 2007). The result is that states may engage in strategic 
regulatory competition when setting environmental standards. This means that states will take 
into account the level of environmental regulations existing in neighboring states when setting 
their environmental standards in order to gain economic advantage over other states.  
Overall, the interactions between environmental regulations and economic growth 
suggest that there is spatial dependence associated with environmental regulation stringency and 
economic growth outcomes across regions (Anselin et al. 2004). For example, an improvement 
in air quality in one county is likely to benefit neighboring counties and this may improve the 
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attractiveness of the area for investment and retirement relative to other areas. This series of 
events may result in increased population, income, and employment in the area with improved 
environmental quality. In the presence of spillovers, Anselin (1988) points out that ignoring 
spatial dependence in econometric modeling leads to inefficient or biased estimates and spurious 
inferences. Anselin (1988) shows that OLS estimation produces inconsistent results.  
This means that the simultaneous equations specified in (4.21) through (4.24) should be 
estimated by incorporating spatial dependencies. The two most widely used econometric 
approaches for incorporating spatial dependencies are the spatial error model (SEM) and the 
spatial lag model (SLM). The SEM assumes that spatial dependence is caused either by 
unmeasured variables that are correlated across space, which results in omitted variable 
misspecification error, or the use of spatial data that does not match with the actual behavioral 
units being studied (Anselin, 1998). Thus, the general assumption is that the spatial errors across 
different units are correlated—thus violating the OLS assumption, and thereby making OLS 
estimates inefficient and biased.  
(4.25) , 
Where y is the  vector of dependent variables,  is the  matrix of observations on  
exogenous variables,  is the  vector of unknown parameters, and  is the disturbance term 
that follows: 
(4.26)    and     
 is the  spatial weighting matrix of known constants,  is the spatial error coefficient, 
and  is an  vector of innovations. The interpretation of the SEM is that the outcome in 
region  depends on the observed exogenous factors of region  and the error term,   depends 
on the average of the error terms in neighboring regions and an idiosyncratic component defined 
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as  in (4.26). Theoretically, this type of problem can be eliminated by including proper 
explanatory variables, or the use of correct spatial boundaries (Anselin, 1988). However, it is not 
possible to include all relevant explanatory variables, and this typically results in the inclusion of 
irrelevant variables.  
On the other hand, the spatial lag model (SLM) assumes that the value of the dependent 
variables of an area is dependent on the weighted average of the dependent variable of other 
nearby areas  Thus, the SLM assumes that the value of the dependent variable of an area   is 
dependent on the weighted average of the dependent variable of another area and that there are 
no omitted variables. The implication is that the error terms are homoskedastic, as shown in 
equation (4.27) below. 
(4.27) , with     
y is the  vector of observations of the dependent variable,  represents the strength of 
spatial dependence ,  is the  weight matrix that specifies the spatial structure or 
connectivity between regions,  is the  matrix of observations on  exogenous variables, 
and  is the  vector of regression disturbances and assumed to have a normal distribution 
with mean of zero. Since the matrix specifies the spatial dependence structure among the 
observations, it is that assumed that  when observation  is a spatial neighbor to 
observation , and where there is no connectivity between regions .   
Since it is not possible to include all relevant explanatory variables in a model and 
because dependent variables may exhibit spatial dependence, LeSage and Pace (2009) explain 
that the correct model to use is one that includes both a spatial lag of the dependent variable and 
a spatial lag of the explanatory variables. In the spatial econometrics literature, this type of 
model which incorporates both the spatial lag of the dependent variable and the spatial lag of 
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exogenous variables is known as a spatial Durbin model (SDM). LeSage and Fischer (2009) 
assert that the ability of the spatial Durbin model to deal with the problem of omitted variable 
bias and spatial dependences make it a better choice over other spatial econometric models. The 
spatial Durbin model can be expressed as: 
(4.28)  , with    
The notations for the variables ,  are defined in (4.27) while  represents a 
 vector that shows the strength of the relationship for each explanatory variable in the  
matrix. The matrix  is the spatial lag of explanatory variables and reflects the characteristics 
of explanatory variables related to neighboring regions.  
The use of the SDM implies that economic growth and environmental regulations of 
county  are dependent upon the neighboring county‟s economic growth and environmental 
regulations , as well as the county‟s own explanatory variables plus the average of the same 
explanatory variables of nearby counties. Following the above discussion, the spatial Durbin 
model to be estimated is expressed as follows:  
(4.29) 
 
 
(4.30) 
 
 
(4.31) 
 
 
(4.32) 
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 is the  identity matrix, the terms  represent the spatial weights of the dependent 
and explanatory variables, while  denotes the spatial dependences of the dependent variables. 
In particular,  measures the strength of the spatial dependence or the level of influence from 
neighboring regions‟ growth rates. The explanatory variables included in the spatial Durbin 
model validly remain the same as those specified in the non-spatial model.  
LeSage and Pace (2009) explain that interpretation of the SDM model differs from 
conventional non-spatial regression in that the SDM model takes into account the spatial 
spillover effects arising from a change in the variable  (contained in the  vector of exogenous 
variables) in one county with respect to the change in   in other counties. LeSage and Pace 
assert that the spatial connectivity relationships incorporated in the spatial Durbin model entail 
that a change in the explanatory variable in one region directly impacts the region where changes 
emanate from, also indirectly impacts other nearby regions. They show that the partial derivative 
that takes into account the effect of changes in the dependent variable  in region  due to 
changes on the variable  in region  can be expressed as a  matrix, as shown below: 
(4.33)   
and  represent the coefficient parameter coefficients,  is the 
main diagonal of the partial derivatives, and represents the direct effects of the impacts arising 
from own-county changes in the variable  To be more precise, the direct effects represent the 
change in  in a particular county due to a change in a county‟s own explanatory variables. 
LeSage and Pace (2009) also explain that the row sum of the off diagonal terms produce the 
indirect effects (spatial spillovers) and these are associated with the marginal effects of the first-
order, second-order, third-order neighbors, etc. Another important interpretation offered by 
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LeSage and Pace (2009) is that of the total effect, which is defined as the sum of the direct and 
indirect effects.  
Following LeSage and Kirby (2009), the relative impacts of the spillover effects in this 
study are presumed to be influenced by the spatial proximity of counties, the degree of 
connectivity between counties reflected by the matrix , the magnitudes of the coefficient 
parameter coefficients and  and the strength of the spatial dependences, denoted by . This 
can also be construed to mean that there is a decay of influence in terms of spillover impacts as 
the distance between counties increases.  
4.3 Data Description 
The data are for counties in the Appalachian region and cover the years 1992 to 2007. 
The dependent variables used in the models are measured as absolute changes in population, 
employment, income, and environmental regulations (1992-2007). Table 4.1 gives the 
description and sources of the endogenous variables and the initial condition variables used. 
County-level data for population, employment, and income are obtained from the Bureau of 
Economic Analysis, Regional Economic Information System (REIS) and County and City Data 
Book (C&CDB) covering the years 1992 to 2007. County attainment status is used as a proxy for 
environmental regulation stringency and the data will be obtained from the Federal Code of 
Regulations, Title 40, part 81, subpart C, covering the years 1992 to 2007.  
Given that a county can be out-of-attainment with respect to several air pollutants, the 
environmental regulation variable is an index of the total number of pollutants for which a 
county is out-of-attainment. The environmental regulation index is constructed using 
Henderson‟s (1997) methodology of summing the number of criteria pollutants a county is out-
of-attainment. The criteria pollutants considered are ozone (O3), sulfur dioxide (SO2), carbon 
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monoxide (CO), lead (Pb), and total suspended particulates (TSP). Following Henderson (1997) 
and List (2001), the attainment variable takes on values from 0 (cleanest county and least 
regulated) to 5 (dirtiest and most regulated)—and generally depends on the number of pollutants 
the county is out-of-attainment. For example, a county in attainment for five criteria pollutants 
takes on a value of 0, whereas a county out-of-attainment in all five criteria pollutants will be 
coded 5. With regard to the ozone standard, when part of the county has not met the complete 
federal ozone standard, the EPA assigns to these counties partial attainment or non-attainment 
status. For this reason, counties which are in partial attainment are coded ½. The year 1992 is the 
start period for analysis.  
Table 4.1: List of Endogenous Variables and Initial Conditions 
Endogenous 
 Variable 
Description Data Source 
POPCH Change in population (1992-2007) Computed:   
PCICH Change in Per Capita Income (1992-2007) Computed:  
EMPCH Change in total employment (1992-2007) Computed:  
ENREG Change in attainment status (1992-2007): 
0= attainment, ½ to 5= number of 
pollutants out-of-attainment 
Computed:  
Initial Conditions   
POP92 County population in 1992 REIS/C&CDB 
PCI92 County Per capita income in 1992 REIS/C&CDB 
EMP92 County Employment in 1992 REIS/C&CDB 
ENREG92 County attainment status in 1992 CFR, Title 40, Part 81, Subpart C  and 
EPA Green book 
 
A number of explanatory variables are included to explain changes in population, 
employment, income, and environmental regulations. Table 4.2 presents the description and 
sources of all the exogenous variables included in the empirical models. For convenience, the 
variables are divided into five distinct categories:  
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a) Accessibility variables 
Accessibility variables include state road density (ROADDEN) and counties classified as 
metro (METRO). State road density data reflect the level of infrastructure development and the 
data comes from the Natural Resource Analysis Centre (NRAC) of West Virginia University 
(WVU), while data on county classification comes from the United States Department of 
Agriculture (USDA) Economic Research Service (ERS). 
b) Human Capital variables 
Human capital factors include proportion of population 25 years and above with 
Bachelor‟s degree or higher (DEGREE) and proportion of population between 18 and 64 years 
(ACTIVE). All human capital data are obtained from the County and City Data Book (C&CDB, 
1994). 
c) Economic Variables 
Economic variables considered are per capita local government expenditure (LGEXP), 
per capita taxes (PCTAX); poverty rate (POVRATE); property taxes (PROPTAX); manufacturing 
establishments (MFG); percentage of employees working in manufacturing (MFGEMP); median 
housing value (MHVAL); and unemployment rate (UNEMP) indicates whether the local 
population is employable. Data on manufacturing establishments is obtained from the Business 
Dynamic Statistics of the U.S. Census bureau (BDS). The BDS database contains data on 
number of firms by category, age, size, and location, including key economic data such as 
employment, number of establishments, and so forth. All other economic data are obtained from 
the C&CDB. 
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d) Demographic variables 
This group of variables include percentage of Black population (BLACK); proportion of 
population below 5 years and proportion of population above 65 years (RISK); crime rates 
(CRIME); and population density (POPDEN). Demographic data was obtained from the 
C&CDB. 
e) Environmental Quality variables 
To capture environmental quality, the following factors are used: presence of a Sierra 
chapter in a county (SIERRA); votes cast for Democratic President in 1992 elections (VOTE); 
USDA natural amenities index (AMEND); and percentage of population 16 and above driving to 
work (POPDRIVE). Environmental quality data comes from different sources, including internet 
searches. Data on county Sierra chapters was obtained from the Sierra Club Website, while data 
on the amenity index comes from the USDA-ERS. The amenity index reflects individual‟s 
preference for environmental quality and was constructed by combining six measures of climate, 
topography, and water. Data on percent of votes cast for the Democratic presidential candidate 
and proportion of population considered to be risky comes from the C&CDB. 
4.3.1 Population Equation 
Specification of variables in the population equation follows economic theory and 
existing literature. The dependent variable is the change in population ( ), which is 
defined as the difference between population in 2007 and population in 1992. The population 
equation includes the initial conditions of the endogenous variables as explanatory variables. 
This specification follows on the convergence hypothesis suggested by Barro and Sala-i-Martin 
(1992), which suggests that there is a negative relationship between the growth in population 
over time and the initial level of population. The implication of this negative relationship is that 
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population growth in counties with higher population levels will be slower than counties which 
have low population levels. The initial conditions of the endogenous variables include 1992 
levels of population (POP92), employment (EMP92), and environmental regulations (ENVR92), 
including the three endogenous variables of employment (EMPCH), per capita income (PCICH), 
and environmental regulations (ENREGCH).  
Environmental regulation stringency in this context refers to whether a county is in-
attainment or out-of-attainment. It is hypothesized that counties in attainment will experience 
high population increases because of people‟s perceptions on improved environmental quality. 
This might also mean that firms are going to positively view counties in attainment and hence 
influence their investment decisions.   
Other control variables in the population equation include fiscal factors such as per capita 
income taxes (PCTAX), property taxes (PROPTAX), and per capita local government expenditure 
(LGEXP). It is hypothesized that PROPTAX has a negative effect on population change, as this 
represents an additional cost to households and firms, and thus deters in-migration while 
encouraging out-migration. On the other hand, LGEXP is expected to have a positive effect on 
population growth considering the fact that government expenditure increases provision of 
public goods and services, such as highways, education, health, and other public safety services 
(police, fire departments, etc.).  
Other control variables for population change are the natural amenity index (AMEND), 
county unemployment rate (UNEMP), median housing values (MHVAL), manufacturing 
establishments (MFG), and accessibility variables, such as road density of state roads 
(ROADDEN). Amenity variables (AMEND) are included in order to capture quality of life and 
are expected to have a positive impact on population change. Counties with high unemployment 
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rates (UNEMP) signal a limited number of economic opportunities available in the local 
economy, and thus, the coefficient for unemployment rate is expected to be negative. 
Housing values (MHVAL) are included in order to account for the cost of living, and thus 
it is expected that high housing prices negatively affect population growth and, conversely, low 
housing values positively influence population growth. State road density (ROADDEN) measures 
the extent and coverage of the paved road infrastructure within a county and this is associated 
with improved mobility, and thus may result in increased population.  
Two variables are included to control for differences in growth patterns among counties, 
a dummy variable (METRO) representing metropolitan counties and number of manufacturing 
establishments in a county (MFG). It is hypothesized that metropolitan counties (METRO) and 
counties with a high number of manufacturing establishments (MFG) experience faster 
population growth due to the presence of agglomeration economies.    
(4.34) 
  
 
4.3.2 Employment Equation 
Variables in the employment equation have been chosen for their ability to reflect long-
run supply and demand conditions in the labor market in a given county. The dependent variable 
in the employment equation is the change in employment (EMPCH) between 1992 and 2007. 
Like the population equation, the employment equation includes the initial conditions of the 
endogenous variables as explanatory variables, including the three endogenous variables of 
changes in population (POPCH), per capita income (PCICH), and environmental regulations 
(ENREGCH). The initial conditions included are 1992 levels of population (POP92), 1992 
68 
 
employment conditions (EMP92), and environmental regulations (ENREG92). Past studies show 
that higher initial levels of population positively affect employment growth. 
Fiscal related control variables are included in order to determine their impact on 
employment growth. Fiscal variables included in the employment are per capita local 
government expenditure (LGEXP), property tax (PROPTAX), and per capita taxes (PCTAX). 
Given that local government expenditures are associated with provision of public goods, it is 
hypothesized that LGEXP is positively related to employment growth. The impact of taxes on 
consumers is illustrated in Tiebout‟s (1956) work, which shows that a reduction in government 
programs or an increase in taxes by a local jurisdiction results in out-migration and discourages 
in-migration. Therefore, it is hypothesized that PROPTAX and PCTAX are negatively related to 
employment growth.  
Other important explanatory variables for employment growth are human capital factors. 
Human capital variables included in the employment equation is the proportion of county‟s 
population 25 years and over with a bachelor‟s degree or higher (DEGREE). The proportion of 
population of persons 25 and above is included in the equation in order to control for the effect 
of labor force quality, with the assumption that a person with a college degree has higher skills 
and knowledge which can be used to expand firms‟ production as well as entice other firms to 
locate in the area.  Also related to employment growth is the notion that the Democratic Party 
pursues pro-employment policies (Levitt and Poterba, 1999). Percent of votes cast for the 
Democratic presidential candidate (VOTE) are used as a proxy for the Democratic Party‟s control 
of the executive office. It is hypothesized that VOTE will be positively related to employment 
growth. 
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To account for labor availability, county unemployment rates (UNEMP) are included in 
the employment equation. High unemployment rates generally indicate that the local economy is 
in distress, which consequently discourage firms from locating to an economically depressed 
county. Therefore, it is hypothesized that unemployment rate (UNEMP) is negatively related to 
employment growth. Similarly, counties experiencing high crime rates may discourage firms 
from locating there, and consequently affect employment growth. The variable CRIME is 
included to account for the negative externality, and it is hypothesized that CRIME is negatively 
related to employment growth. 
Following the seminal work by Aschauer (1989), numerous studies (Carlino and Mills, 
1987; Duffy-Deno, 1998; Munnell, 1990) have shed light on the impact of transport investment 
on employment growth. Location theory suggests that provision of highway infrastructure 
investment can significantly reduce marginal costs of production and consumption in a given 
area by reducing the cost of transporting goods and services. Therefore, it is hypothesized that 
interstate road density (ROADDEN) is positively related to employment growth. 
Another measure of agglomeration economies included is the number of manufacturing 
establishments (MFG). Within this context, it is hypothesized that manufacturing establishment 
is positively related to employment growth.  
(4.35) 
  
 
4.3.3 Per Capita Income Equation  
 Variables in the income equation have been chosen based on their hypothesized 
relationship to productivity gains, which translates into increased per capita income. The per 
capita income equation is estimated as a function of endogenous variables, namely employment 
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(EMPCH), population (POPCH), and environmental regulations (ENREGCH), including the 
initial conditions of the endogenous variables, PCI92 and POP92.  
  Other variables included in the per capita income equation include per capita local 
government expenditure (LGEXP), which measures provision of services and goods and is 
assumed to be an important input in the development of human capital as well as productivity 
improvement for manufacturing, agriculture, wholesale, and trade industries (Connolly and Fox, 
2004). Therefore, it is hypothesized that local government expenditure is positively related to 
income growth. Another fiscal variable included is the per capita income tax (PCTAX), a variable 
whose impact on per capita income growth remains open. Therefore, no priori assumptions are 
made with regard to the impact of PCTAX on income growth.  
Natural amenities (AMEND) are presumed to explain income growth since they reflect 
the quality of life available to the local population. Based on previous studies (Kahsai, 2009, 
McGranahan, 1999), it is expected that AMEND has a positive relationship with income growth. 
The literature shows that access to amenities attracts wealthy retirees, who subsequently increase 
a given areas‟ per capita income. Another measure that has been used in previous studies to 
explain income growth is the political party in control of the federal government. Levitt and 
Poterba (1994) find evidence that show that states with a large share of Democrats in the House 
of Representatives experience faster per capita income growth relative to those with fewer 
democrats. To account for party control, the percentage of votes cast for the Democratic 
presidential candidate in the 1992 elections (VOTE) is included, and it is hypothesized that 
VOTE is positively related to income growth. 
To capture the effects of demographic factors on income growth, the percent of 
population 65 years or older is included to represent the retired labor force (RETIRE). Generally, 
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the main source of income for retirees is social security benefits. Ceteris paribus, counties with a 
high proportion of retired labor force experience slower income growth. On the other hand, the 
active labor force represented by the proportion of population between 18 years and 65 years 
(ACTIVE) derive most of their income from wage and salaried jobs. Thus it is expected that 
ACTIVE is positively related to income growth.  
High income growth is also associated with educational attainment as this increases an 
individual‟s productive and entrepreneur knowledge and skills. To account for the impact of 
education in income growth, proportion of population 25 years or older with a bachelor‟s degree 
or higher education (DEGREE) is included. Another important measure that is hypothesized to 
increase per capita income growth is the number of manufacturing establishments (MFG) present 
in a county, due to its large labor demands.  
The percent of population that is African Americans (BLACK) is included to control for 
the relative impact of the black population on income. This variable has been widely used in 
income inequality studies because of its ability to capture labor market discrimination which 
results in lower wages (Garofalo and Fogarty, 1979). A negative relationship is hypothesized 
between percent of population that is black and per capita income. Also, in order to explain 
income growth, the percent of families living below the poverty rate (POVRATE) is included, 
and ceteris paribus, counties with a high percentage of the population below the poverty line are 
expected to experience slow income growth.  
(4.36) 
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4.3.4 Environmental Regulations Equation 
The environmental regulations equation is estimated as a function of initial conditions for 
environmental regulations and all endogenous variables, including the initial conditions. 
Considering the fact that environmental quality has a high income elasticity of demand, the 
coefficient for income is expected to be positive as will be the coefficients of population and 
employment change.  
Other control variables include the share of population under 5 years and above 65 years 
(RISK). Share of population below 5 years and above 65 years is designed to capture the 
population which is more susceptible to suffer from chronic illnesses due to environmental 
exposures. Ceteris paribus, an increase in the proportion of the sensitive group of people results 
in an increase in the demand for stringent environmental regulations. To control for urban or 
metro effects, a metro (METRO) dummy variable is included and this accounts for the 
congestion effects. Metro areas generally have an array of economic activities which rely on 
trucks, trains, and cars for transportation of inputs and outputs to the markets. This high 
concentration of economic activity may result in large emissions of pollutants, thereby increasing 
the demand for stricter enforcement of environmental regulations. Thus the metro variable is 
hypothesized to have a positive effect on environmental regulations stringency. In addition, 
metro areas have a large presence of lobby groups, which means more pressure for stringent 
environmental regulation.  
Another demographic factor included as an explanatory variable is the percent of the 
black population (BLACK) that controls for the marginal exposures to pollution. The 
environmental justice literature documents that the African American population and Hispanic 
population are marginally more exposed to environmental damages than the white population 
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(Morrone, 2008; Sicotte, 2009).  Therefore, it is hypothesized that percentage of black 
population (BLACK) is negatively related to environmental regulation stringency. Additional 
evidence from the environmental justice literature indicates that the prevailing socio-economic 
conditions of individuals and areas will influence environmental outcomes, and thus low income 
and high poverty areas are associated with poor environmental quality. County poverty rates 
(POVRATE) are included to control for economic condition, and it is expected that high poverty 
rates are negatively associated with environmental regulation stringency.  
Community/public activism towards environmental issues emanates from the population 
that is susceptible to illnesses due to environmental exposure, as well as from environmental 
pressure and other interest groups. The presence of Sierra Clubs in counties (SIERRA) controls 
for community/public environmental activism. These groups are known to be pro-environment 
and thus will exert pressure for stringent environmental regulations. Therefore, it is hypothesized 
that the Sierra variable is positively related to enforcement of environmental regulations.  
Additional pressure on environmental regulations comes from manufacturing workers 
who may demand lower environmental standards in order to protect their jobs. In this case, a 
negative relationship between manufacturing employment and environmental regulations is 
found. However, when viewed from the perspective of a pollution-intensive sector, an increase in 
manufacturing employment (MFGEMP) may imply an increase in environmental regulation 
enforcements due to increased pollution. Therefore, the expected sign on MFGEMP can be 
positive or negative as explained above.  
Population density (POPDEN) controls for the congestion externalities, which imply that 
densely populated areas lead to more waste generation, and thus it is expected that counties with 
higher population densities positively influence environmental regulation stringency. Other 
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control variables include proportion of persons 25 years and older with a bachelor‟s degree 
(DEGREE) and proportion of population driving to work (POPDRIVE), and the state road 
density (ROADDEN). The level of human capital development influences an individual‟s 
interest, knowledge, and understanding of environmental issues, including the effectiveness of 
the group to lobby against pollution. Thus, it is hypothesized that education (DEGREE) is 
positively related to environmental regulation stringency.  
Undoubtedly, employment growth and population growth entail increased usage of 
vehicles, and given that vehicles are a major source of emissions which contribute to air 
pollution it is hypothesized that the proportion of persons driving to work (POPDRIVE) will be 
positively related to strict environmental regulations. According to Cassady (2004), highway 
expansions have increased vehicle miles traveled and this has also resulted in increased emission 
of pollutants due to changes in land use and neighborhood characteristics. State road density 
controls for the traffic density and it hypothesized that state road density (ROADDEN) is 
positively related to environmental regulation stringency.  
Another measure which can explain environmental outcomes is political party ideology. 
Previous studies show that the stringency of U.S. environmental regulations is influenced by the 
political party that controls the executive branch and legislature (Lynch, et al. 2004; Regens et 
al., 1997). Accordingly, the Democratic Party is considered to be more supportive of stringent 
environmental regulations than the Republican Party. To account for political ideology, the 
percentage of votes cast for the democratic president (VOTE) in the 1992 election is included as 
a proxy for environmental regulation preference for the elected officials. The variable VOTE is 
hypothesized to be positively related to environmental regulation stringency.   
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(4.37) 
  
  
4.4 Estimation Methods 
Because the equations specified in (4.34) to (4.37) are structural equations, three stage 
least squares (3SLS) estimation will be used. 3SLS is preferred to two stage least squares (2SLS) 
because of the possible correlation of the error terms, which is not addressed by 2SLS 
estimation. Therefore, the advantage of using 3SLS is that it is a full information estimation 
technique which takes into account information from other equations, and thereby producing 
asymptotically efficient estimates than the two stage least squares (2SLS). However, Wooldridge 
(2002) explains that when a system of equations is just-identified, 2SLS is algebraically identical 
to 3SLS, and in this situation, both estimation techniques produce consistent and efficient 
parameter estimates. The spatial Durbin model (SDM) represented by equations (4.29) to (4.32) 
will be estimated using the codes contained in James LeSage‟s Spatial Econometrics MATLAB 
toolbox. 
Table 4.3 presents the summary statistics of the exogenous variables and endogenous 
variables used in the models. Columns 1 and 2 show the standard deviation and average values 
of the variables, while columns 3 and 4 show the minimum and maximum values of the 
variables. A perusal of column shows that the maximum number of pollutants that counties were 
out of attainment is four. Out of the 410 counties, three counties were out-of-attainment for four 
criteria pollutants (particulate matter, sulfur dioxide, carbon monoxide, and ozone). 
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Table 4.2: Description of Exogenous Variables 
Exogenous 
 Variables 
Description Data Source 
 Human Capital Variables  
ACTIVE Percentage of population between 18 years and 64 years C&CDB, 1994 
DEGREE Percent of persons 25 yrs & above with college degree C&CDB/Computed, 1994 
 Demographic Variables  
POPDEN Total population/land area REIS/Computed 
RISK Percentage of population below 5 years plus above 65 CC&CDB 1994 
RETIRE Percentage of population above 65 years CC&CDB 1994 
 Economic Variables  
PROPTAX Per capita local property tax C&CDB, 1994 
MFG Number of manufacturing establishments in a county U.S. Census Bureau Dynamic Business Series (DBS) 
MFGEMP Percent of civilian labor force employed in manufacturing REIS/C&CDB, 1994 
UNEMP Civilian labor force unemployment rate (percent) REIS/C&CDB, 1994 
POVRATE Percent of families with income below poverty rate REIS/C&CDB, 1994 
PCTAX Local tax per capita, 1992 C&CDB, 1992 
CRIME Serious Crimes per 100,000 of population, 1992 C&CDB, 1992 
MHVAL County median housing value C&CDB, 1994 
LGEXP Per capita local government expenditure C&CDB, 1994 
 Accessibility/Location Variables  
METRO Metropolitan counties, dummy  variable=1, 0 otherwise USDA/ERS-Creative class code 
ROADDEN Miles of state roads per square mile NRAC, WVU 
 Environmental Quality  
AMEND Natural amenities index USDA/ERS 
DRIVE Percentage of population 16 and above driving to work C&CDB, 1994 
VOTE Percentage of votes cast for Democratic President C&CDB, 1994 
SIERRA Dummy: 1 = Sierra Chapters in a County, 0 otherwise Sierra Club 
POPDRIVE Percentage of population above 17 years driving to work C&CDB, 1992 
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Table 4.3: Summary Statistics 
Variable Name STD Mean Min Max 
ACTIVE          30.582 62.61 0 456.04 
AMEND           1.1632 0.13266 -3.72 3.55 
CRIME         1560.8 2251.9 0 8487 
DEGREE          4.981 10.498 3.7 41.7 
EMP92        53959 25010 0 820000 
EMPCH         13524 5453.5 -6124 203000 
ENREG92          0.73343 0.329268 0 4 
ENREGCH        0.647933 0.282926 0 3 
LGEXP         2344.7 3782.7 0 33391 
METRO            0.44102 0.26341 0 1 
MFG             120.53 67.824 0 1627 
MFGEMP          11.367 26.236 0 53.6 
MHVAL        13528 47631 15800 118000 
PCI92        2530.2 13630 0 22226 
PCICH        2152.3 10867 0 19917 
PCTAX         160.88 285.31 0 1317 
POP92       89059 50945 0 1340000 
POPCH         22862 6196.8 -102000 363000 
POPDEN         133.03 101.27 6.33 1838.3 
POPDRIVE      5.3388 73.827 51.9 85.1 
POVRATE               8.0139 19.019 0 52.1 
PROPTAX            17.519 72.362 0 99.1 
RISK           2.6548 20.921 0 30.45 
ROADDEN          0.11601 0.32637 0 0.73933 
SIERRA           0.46872 0.67561 0 1 
UNEMP            3.1947 9.3524 3.4 22.6 
VOTE            10.065 42.386 17.1 82.8 
 
In 1992, 22 of the 410 Appalachian counties were completely out of attainment for at least one 
criteria pollutant. Between 1992 and 2007, this number increased to 89, representing a 75 percent 
increase. A majority of these counties were out-of-attainment for the TSP and ozone standard.  
78 
 
CHAPTER 5 
EMPIRICAL RESULTS AND ANALYSES 
5.0 Introduction  
The focus of this chapter is to estimate the empirical models on the relationship between 
environmental regulations and regional growth. Indicators for regional growth are per capita 
income growth, population growth, and employment growth, while county attainment status is 
used as a proxy for environmental regulation stringency. The models are estimated using two 
techniques; three stage least squares and the spatial Durbin model (SDM). The rest of this 
chapter is organized as follows. Section 5.1 presents a discussion on the results for the non-
spatial model, while section 5.2 presents a discussion on the results for the spatial Durbin Model.    
5.1 Non-Spatial Growth Model Results 
Given that estimation of the non-spatial model involves four structural equations 
represented by change in employment, population, environmental regulations, and per capita 
income, it is highly plausible that the error terms in each equation are related. Consequently, 
estimation by ordinary least squares will provide inconsistent and inefficient estimates. In order 
to overcome this problem, full information estimation techniques such three stage least squares 
(3SLS), GMM, or the full information maximum likelihood (FIML) have been suggested as 
appropriate estimation methods because they take into account the restrictions on parameters in 
all structural equations (Wooldridge, 2002). For the purpose of this study, three stage least 
squares will be used for estimating the non-spatial structural equations (4.34 to 4.37) and 
estimation will be done in Eviews.  Tables 5.1 through 5.4 summarize the non-spatial structural 
equation estimates.  
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5.1.2 Change in Population Equation 
Table 5.1 presents summary results for the population growth equation. The coefficient 
estimate for the initial condition of population (POP92) has the expected negative sign and is 
significant at the 1 percent level. This finding confirms the convergence hypothesis, which 
suggests that counties which had initial high levels of population will tend to experience a lower 
growth rate than counties which had low levels of population in the initial period. On the other 
hand, the coefficient estimate for EMP92 is positive and is significantly different from zero. The 
positive coefficient for EMP92 confirms the „jobs follow people‟ hypothesis.  
Change in environmental regulations (ENREGCH) has a positive impact on population 
growth and the coefficient is statistically significant at the 10 percent level. One possible 
explanation for this positive relationship between environmental regulations and population 
growth may be that stringent environmental regulations result in improved environmental quality 
and thus make local areas to become attractive for businesses and households. This argument is 
similar to the one advanced by Goetz et al. (1996, p.100) who assert that when environmental 
regulation results in improved environmental quality, growth rates may subsequently increase. 
Change in employment (EMPCH) has a positive effect on population growth, indicating that an 
increase in employment growth (or an increase in labor demand) stimulates population growth. 
The coefficient for EMPCH is statistically significant at the 1 percent level, and thus shows that 
jobs follow people. Also, the role of per capita income change (PCICH) in explaining growth in 
population is strong, as reflected by the magnitude and positive sign of the coefficient 
(significant at the 5 percent level).  
As hypothesized, the unemployment rate (UNEMP) has a negative effect on population 
growth and is statistically significant at the 10 percent level. Generally, high unemployment rates 
80 
 
indicate economic distress and a dearth of employment opportunities. Consequently, counties 
with high unemployment rates discourage in-migration and conversely encourage out-migration. 
These findings are consistent with results from past studies (Gebremariam, 2006; Mojica, 2009). 
Estimated results also show that median housing values (MHVAL) and population growth have a 
negative relationship, but the coefficient for (MHVAL) is not significant. Manufacturing 
establishment (MFG) has an unexpected negative effect on population growth and its coefficient 
is insignificantly different from zero. The negative coefficient may be due to the declining role of 
manufacturing in the Appalachian economy. State road density (ROADDEN) appears to have a 
positive effect on population growth, but is also insignificantly different from zero. 
The estimated coefficient for local government expenditure (LGEXP) is positive and 
statistically significant at the 5 percent level. This implies that local government spending 
programs that are aimed providing a mix of goods and services stimulate population growth in 
that area. By contrast, per capita local property tax (PROPTAX) is negatively related to 
population growth and its coefficient is insignificant at the 5 percent level. This finding 
reinforces the notion that individuals avoid locating in jurisdictions with higher taxes. The 
relationship between per capital local taxes (PCTAX) and population growth indicate a positive 
relationship. This finding, definitely counters economic theory and it is not surprising that the 
coefficient for PCTAX is statistically insignificant. 
The coefficient for metropolitan location (METRO) is positive and statistically significant 
at the 1 percent level. The regression analysis also reveals a significant positive relationship 
between the amenities (AMEND) and population growth. One possible explanation is that high 
amenity counties provide a variety of recreation activities which create employment 
opportunities for the local communities, and thus high amenity counties become attractive 
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locations for business investment and households. These findings are consistent with results from 
previous studies (Kahsai, 2009; McGranahan, 1999; Deller et al. 2001).  
Table 2.1: 3SLS Regression Estimation of Change in Population 
Independent 
Variable 
Expected Sign Coefficient -value 
       POP92 - -0.1479 0.0000 
       EMP92 + 0.6389 0.0030 
       ENREG92 -/+ -0.0324 0.1036 
       PCICH + 1.8852 0.0016 
       EMPCH + 2.0809 0.0000 
       ENREGCH -/+ 0.8429 0.0148 
       MHVAL - -0.0084 0.7933 
       PCTAX - 3.0792 0.1915 
       AMEND + 1760.273 0.0014 
       PROPTAX - -36.7472 0.1856 
       UNEMP - -211.1728 0.0370 
       MFG + -6.5621 0.7137 
       LGEXP + 1.2900 0.0041 
       METRO + 8401.985 0.0006 
       ROADDEN + 2329.112 0.5705 
       CONSTANT  9013.233 0.0019 
        = 0.883053 
       N= 410 
 
5.1.3 Change in Employment Equation 
The estimated results for the employment growth equation are shown in table 5.2.  The 
initial condition for employment (EMP92) has a statistically significant and negative effect on 
employment growth. The implication of this finding is that counties with initial low employment 
levels in the 1990s are experiencing faster growth in employment than counties which had high 
initial levels of employment. These results are consistent with findings from previous studies 
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(Gebremariam, 2006; Black et al., 2007) about the convergence in employment rates in the 
Appalachian region. Black et al. (2007) attributes the convergence of employment in the 
Appalachia to the wide diversification of the Appalachian economy. Accordingly, this 
diversification has resulted in the growth of the service sector, retail sector, and growth in 
government employment.  
The estimated coefficient on initial conditions for population (POP92) is statistically 
significant and positive, thus confirming the hypothesis that people follow jobs. An increase in 
population entails a larger supply of labor. The interpretation of the results is that a 1 point 
increase in population is associated with a 1.09 points increase in employment. The positive 
effect of population on employment growth is supported by evidence from the Appalachian 
Regional Commission which shows that between 2002 and 2004, there was a large of growth of 
employment in both the Appalachia and the nation as a whole.7 Therefore, it is surmised that the 
increase in population did not diminish employment opportunities, but rather was necessary to 
meet the increasing demand for labor.  
The coefficient on the initial condition for environmental regulations (ENREG92) has a 
negative and statistically significant effect on employment growth. The plausible explanation for 
this negative correlation is that, following the designation of counties as attainment or non-
attainment in 1990, the EPA required states to submit state implementation plans (SIPs) at the 
end of 1992, and therefore, between 1990 and 1992 polluting firms faced stringent measures with 
regard to pollution control. This is an important finding because it reveals that stringent 
environmental regulations negatively affect employment growth in the initial years of 
implementation due to the fact that polluting firms have to install expensive pollution abatement 
                                                          
7 See Appalachian Region Employment Report on  
http://www.arc.gov/images/appregion/AppalachianRegionEmploymentReport2009Q2.pdf   
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control equipment. The effect of this may inadvertently be transmitted to other sectors of the 
economy, which, consequently results in overall slow-down of total employment growth.  
On the other hand, the coefficient on the change in environmental regulations 
(ENREGCH) is positive and statistically significant at the 1 percent level. These results reinforce 
the Porter hypothesis and show that firms‟ marginal costs of abatement may decrease over time 
as firms invest in efficient technology. Therefore, the efficient technology firms invest in serves 
the dual role of improving productivity and enhancing environmental quality, such that areas 
become important locations for businesses and households.    
The coefficient on the change in population (POPCH) is statistically significant at the 1 
percent level and is positively related to employment growth. This finding, again, confirms the 
“people follow jobs” hypothesis espoused by Steinnes (1982). Similarly, change in per capita 
income (PCICH) is statistically significant at the 1 percent level and is positively related to 
employment growth. This means that Appalachian counties with high income experienced 
increased growth in employment, and this could be attributed to the economy-wide 
diversification that has taken place in the Appalachia.  
Another variable that might be expected to affect labor demand is the percentage of the 
population with a bachelor‟s degree or higher (DEGREE). The coefficient for DEGREE is 
positive as hypothesized, but has no significant effect on employment growth. Conceptually, 
metropolitan counties are expected to have high employment growths, but the coefficient for 
metro counties (METRO) is negative and insignificantly different from zero. Similarly, state road 
density (ROADDEN) does not appear to be an important explanatory factor for employment 
growth. 
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Local government expenditure (LGEXP) is also regressed against employment growth. 
The coefficient estimate for local government expenditure (LGEXP) is positive as hypothesized 
and is statistically significant (5% level). Another fiscal factor likely to affect employment 
growth is the local tax per capita (PCTAX). The coefficient on local tax per capita (PCTAX) has 
an unexpected positive sign, but statistically insignificant. The positive coefficient on PCTAX 
counters economic theory, and can perhaps be construed to mean that an increase in the local tax 
rate entails an increase in local government revenue; therefore, an increase in local government 
revenue may entail provision of more services to the local communities. The last fiscal variable 
is per capita local property tax (PROPTAX), and its coefficient is also insignificantly different 
from zero.  
Employment growth is also positively influenced by the number of manufacturing 
establishments, as reflected by the positive and statistically significant coefficient for 
manufacturing establishment (MFG). Unemployment rate (UNEMP) is negatively related to 
employment growth and its coefficient is statistically insignificant. Another factor believed to 
influence employment growth relates to political ideology. The percent of votes cast for the 
Democratic presidential candidate (VOTE) in the 1992 presidential elections is regressed against 
employment growth. The estimated coefficient for VOTE is positive but highly insignificant.   
The coefficient for the amenities index (AMEND) is negative and statistically significant 
at the 5% percent level. This means that high amenities are associated with a decline in overall 
employment growth. The negative correlation can be attributed to the fact that the amenities 
index is a composite score which represents a variety of attributes and thus the importance of 
individual attributes may be overshadowed. Another variable that has an unexpected sign is the 
crime rate (CRIME), which has a positive but statistically insignificant coefficient. This positive 
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correlation between crime rate and employment growth can be attributed to the fact that other 
location factors available within counties are more important in stimulating employment growth 
and thus may overshadow the negative externalities stemming from crime.  
 
Table 5.2: 3SLS Regression Estimation of Change in Employment 
    
Independent 
Variable 
Expected Sign Coefficient -value 
EMP92 - -0.0638 0.0007 
ENREG92 +/- -0.0862 0.0000 
POP92 + 1.0916 0.0000 
PCICH + 2.1597 0.0000 
POPCH - 0.4509 0.0000 
ENREGCH +/- 0.5199 0.0000 
DEGREE + 14.5365 0.5409 
LGEXP - 0.7006 0.0037 
PROPTAX - -7.3759 0.5747 
UNEMP - -96.6829 0.1419 
METRO + -2611.307 0.0655 
MFG + 22.7049 0.0103 
AMEND + -764.2158 0.0038 
CRIME - 0.0171 0.8337 
ROADDEN + 606.3321 0.7850 
PCTAX - 2.4506 0.1145 
VOTE + 0.6503 0.9686 
CONSTANT  7389.006 0.0199 
 = 0.8580 
N = 410 
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5.1.4 Change in Per Capita Income Equation 
Three stage least squares regression results for the per capita income equation are 
reported in table 5.3. The estimated coefficient for initial condition for per capita income 
(PCI92) is negative and its coefficient is statistically significant at the 1 percent level. The 
negative coefficient for PCI92 confirms the convergence hypothesis, which suggests that 
counties with lower incomes grow faster than higher income counties. Gebremariam (2006) and 
Santopietro (2002) also find evidence of income convergence in the Appalachia. On the other 
hand, the coefficient estimate for initial population (POP92) has a positive effect on per capita 
income growth and is statistically significant at the 5 percent level. The interpretation of this 
result is that initial levels of population are representative of labor supply and thus have a 
positive impact on output and per capita income growth. Although this estimate for this variable 
is statistically significant, its magnitude is relatively small.  
The sign and level of significance for the initial condition for environmental regulation 
(ENREG92) mirrors results obtained in the employment and population equations (negative and 
significant at the 1 percent level). The interpretation of this result is that the extent to which 
environmental regulations influence population growth depends on environmental regulations‟ 
direct effect on economic performance. Under this circumstance, it can be assumed that stringent 
environmental regulations will initially negatively affect economic performance due to firms‟ 
investments in abatement technology, which subsequently reduces labor demand. This negatively 
affects per capita income growth.   
Except for the change in population (POPCH) variable, all growth factors (endogenous 
variables) are significant in explaining growth in per capita income. Economic theory shows that 
growth in employment (EMPCH) results in an increase in aggregate labor demand, and as a 
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result, higher per capita income. The variable EMPCH has the correct positive sign and is 
significant at the 5 percent level. These findings provide empirical evidence of the hypothesized 
positive impact of employment growth on per capita income growth. Similar effects are also seen 
with respect to change in environmental regulations (ENREGCH). The estimated coefficient for 
change in environmental regulations (ENREGCH) is positive and statistically significant at the 1 
percent level.  
Several economic variables are regressed against change in per capita income. High local 
government expenditures generally indicate increased provision of public goods and services. 
Despite having a positive effect on per capita income growth, the coefficient for local govern-
ment expenditure (LGEXP) is insignificant. As hypothesized, an increase in local tax per capita 
(PCTAX) has a negative effect on per capita income growth, because taxes are an additional cost 
to individuals. Thus high tax counties will become unattractive locations for households. 
Regression results show that the percent of population below the poverty level (POVRATE) is 
inversely related to per capita income growth. The coefficient for poverty rate (POVRATE) is 
significant at the 5 percent level. The estimated coefficient for manufacturing establishment 
(MFG) shows a negative relationship with per capita income growth and is only significant at the 
10 percent level. Perhaps the logical explanation for this negative correlation may be that 
manufacturing‟s role in the Appalachian region has evidently declined over the years, to the 
extent of reducing its contribution to per capita income growth, and gross state product in 
general.  
One variable included to capture political party influence on economic growth is the 
percent of votes cast for the Democratic presidential candidate (VOTE). The hypothesis that 
Democratic Party control is associated with increased economic growth is confirmed, based on 
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the positive and significant coefficient for VOTE. Similarly, location attributes, such as amenities 
(AMEND) are positively related to income growth, but its coefficient is insignificant.  
The coefficient for the percentage of population with a bachelor‟s degree or above 
(DEGREE) is positive and significant, providing evidence for the well known relationship 
between human capital skills and income growth. The percentage of population between 18 years 
and 64 years (ACTIVE) is used to indicate the demographic group that is typically considered to 
be in wage and salaried employment. The coefficient for ACTIVE has the correct positive sign, 
but is insignificant. By contrast, an increase in the percent of population 65 years and older 
(RETIRE) is negatively related to per capita income growth and the estimated coefficient for 
RETIRE is significant at the 1 percent level.  
Another demographic variable related to income growth is the percent of Black 
population (BLACK). The coefficient for BLACK is negative and significant at the 10 percent 
level. This finding confirms the hypothesis that counties with larger Black populations are 
inversely related to income growth.  These findings are realistic in view of the fact that majority 
of the black population in the Appalachia live in the southern and central counties.8 By all 
standards, the Appalachian Regional Commission considers the southern and central counties of 
Appalachia to be the most economically distressed.  
5.1.5 Change in Environmental Regulations Equation 
Table 5.4 presents estimated results for the environmental regulations equation. The 
estimated coefficient for 1992 environmental regulations (ENREG92) is positive and statistically 
significant at the 1 percent level. One explanation for this positive coefficient is that counties 
                                                          
8 Young et al. (2007) examine the relationship between race and economic growth using county level data on per 
capita income, socioeconomic, and demographic factors for Mississippi. They find evidence that indicate that an 
increase in percentage of Black population is negatively related to income growth.  
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which are out-of-attainment in the initial period are likely to attract regulatory attention and thus 
positively influence changes in environmental regulations. This is in view of the fact that some 
counties will be out-of-attainment in a number of pollutants. Initial condition for population 
(POP92) is positively related to change in environmental regulation and is significant at the 1 
percent level. This finding illustrates that air pollution varies with population and therefore, an 
increase in population will positively influence environmental regulations stringency. However, 
the magnitude of population is very small.  
Table 5.3: 3SLS Regression Estimation of Change in Per Capita Income 
Independent 
Variable 
Expected 
Sign 
Coefficient -value 
ENREG92 -/+ -0.7414 0.0000 
PCI92 - -0.3823 0.0001 
POP92 + 0.0600 0.0017 
EMPCH + 0.0396 0.0061 
ENREGCH +/- 0.1378 0.0001 
POPCH + 0.0142 0.7423 
PCTAX - -1.7783 0.0943 
DEGREE + 11.8178 0.0063 
AMEND + 863.8531 0.1507 
POVRATE - -85.8305 0.0072 
BLACK - -128.5698 0.0807 
ACTIVE + 37.9073 0.1725 
MFG + -7.0195 0.0566 
RETIRE - -39.7288 0.0002 
VOTE + 99.8252 0.0429 
LGEXP + 34.1256 0.2280 
CONSTANT  0.5909 0.0054 
 = 0.4318 
N = 410    
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On the other hand, 1992 per capita income (PCI92) has a positive effect and thus 
reinforces the hypothesis that an increase in income increases the demand for environmental 
quality, assuming that environmental quality is a normal good. Similarly, a change in per capita 
income (PCICH) has a positive effect on environmental regulation change and thus lends support 
to the theory that at high income levels, the policy response towards environmental degradation 
is stronger. The coefficient estimate for PCICH is statistically significant at the 1 percent level. 
Employment change (EMPCH) is positively related to change in environmental regulations but 
does not attain any statistical significance, while the coefficient for population change (POPCH) 
is negative and statistically significant at the 10 percent level. 
The EPA considers children below 5 years and adults above 65 years to be particularly 
sensitive to exposure to air pollutants. The percentage of the population who are considered 
sensitive (RISK) to environmental exposures has the expected positive sign. Another variable 
that is likely to result in increased emissions is the percentage of population driving to work 
(POPDRIVE). The coefficient for POPDRIVE has the expected positive sign and is significant at 
the 1 percent level. These findings further confirm the association between increased vehicular 
traffic and air pollution. Regression results also indicate that state road density (ROADDEN) 
positively influences changes in environmental regulation. In general, metropolitan counties are 
associated with large population densities and commuters in metro areas typically drive long 
distances to work. Thus, metro areas are associated with increased pollution. Surprisingly, the 
estimated coefficient for METRO is negative and significant at the 1 percent level.  
As expected, the coefficient for population density (POPDEN) is positive and significant 
at the 5 percent level. This follows because a dense population entails increased economic 
activity and this typically translates into increased emissions of pollutants from both firms and 
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households. The percent of votes cast for the Democratic president (VOTE) appears to have a 
positive influence on environmental regulations outcomes. This finding is in accord with Kahn 
and Matsusaka‟s (1997) finding that Democratic presidential voting patterns explain environ-
mental outcomes.  
 
Table 5.4: 3SLS Regression Estimation of Change in Environmental Regulations 
 
 
 
 
 
Independent Variable 
Expected 
Sign 
Coefficient -value 
ENREG92 +/- 0.6756 0.0000 
POP92 + 0.0021 0.0156 
PCI92 + 0.0411 0.0247 
PCICH + 0.0623 0.0007 
POPCH + 0.0044 0.0523 
EMPCH + 0.0536 0.3744 
POVRATE - 0.0081 0.0000 
BLACK - 0.0015 0.0003 
RISK + 0.0078 0.0015 
POPDRIVE + 0.0044 0.0000 
METRO + -0.2506 0.0000 
ROADDEN + 0.1237 0.0022 
SIERRA + 0.0227 0.0065 
DEGREE + 0.0025 0.0005 
MFGEMP +/- 0.0032 0.4777 
VOTE + 0.0028 0.0000 
POPDEN + 0.0026 0.0013 
MFG + 0.0070 0.0380 
CONSTANT  0.52781 0.0000 
 = 0.9251 
N= 410 
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The coefficient for manufacturing establishment (MFG) has the expected positive sign 
and is significant at the 10 percent level. This implies that counties with a high number of 
manufacturing establishments are likely to have more pollution and thus attract more enforce-
ment of environmental regulations. Similarly, the estimated coefficient for percentage of popu-
lation employed in manufacturing (MFGEMP) has the expected positive sign, but is insignifi-
cant.  
The strength of environmental pressure groups on environmental outcomes is captured by 
the presence of Sierra chapters in a county. The coefficient estimate for SIERRA is positive and 
significant at the 5 percent level. These results provide evidence that environmental pressure 
groups are pro-environment and thus will support stringent environmental regulations. 
Additional information on the support for environmental regulation is provided by the positive 
and significant coefficient for proportion of population with a bachelor‟s degree (DEGREE). 
These findings suggest that counties featuring high levels of college graduates more strongly 
support stringent environmental regulations.  
Surprisingly, regression results indicate that counties exhibiting an increase in black 
population (BLACK) are associated with an increase in the stringency of environmental 
regulations. Similarly, the coefficient estimate for poverty rate (POVRATE) is also positive and 
significant at the 1 percent level. These findings contradict the widely held view in the environ-
mental justice literature that environmental regulations are more strictly enforced in predomi-
nantly white (Melosi and Pratt, 2007) and affluent neighborhoods than in black and economically 
depressed neighborhoods. These findings are reinforced by anecdotal evidence presented in 
figure 5.2 which shows, for example, that between 1992 and 2007 none of Mississippi‟s counties 
had a non-attainment designation. This is important in view of the fact that Mississippi contains 
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the largest number of Black population and has the highest unemployment rates in the 
Appalachian Region. These findings corroborate Gray and Deily‟s (1996) finding that more 
enforcement actions are directed towards plants located in communities with high unemployment 
rates. By the same token, it can be inferred that more enforcement actions will be directed 
towards plants located in minority neighborhoods in order to increase political support.   
5.2 Spatial Durbin Model Results 
Estimated results using the 8 nearest neighbors‟ spatial weight matrix are presented in 
tables 5.5 through 5.8. The existence of spatial interdependences in the variables is confirmed by 
the highly statistically and positive coefficients for rho ( . In the analyses that follow, the focus 
is on the interpretation of the direct, indirect, and total effects. The interpretation of these results 
is based on the methodology suggested by LeSage and Pace (2009).  
5.2.1 SDM Results for Change in Population Equation 
Table 5.5 presents the estimated results for the change in population equation. The 
positive and significant coefficient for the spatial dependence parameter (rho provides 
evidence for the existence of the spatial effects working through the dependent variable (change 
in population) and explanatory variables. The estimated direct effect associated with initial 
population level (POP92) is −0.157. This means that, all else equal, a 1 point increase in initial 
population in county  will reduce growth in population by 0.157 points in that county. However, 
it is highly plausible that a change in the initial levels of population in county  not only induces 
direct effects on population change in this county, but also induces indirect effects (spatial 
spillovers) on neighboring counties. The estimated coefficient for the indirect or spatial spillover 
impact for initial population is −0.063, but it is insignificant. Likewise, the total effect associated 
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with initial population is negative and significant. The estimated parameter for the total effect 
suggests that a 1 point increase in initial population will reduce growth in population in county  
and neighboring counties by 0.216. Overall, these findings confirm the convergence hypothesis 
which states that on average, counties with small population levels will grow faster than counties 
with high population levels.  
Turning to employment, the estimated results indicate that initial employment levels 
(EMP92) have a positive direct, indirect, and total effect on population growth. The estimated 
coefficients for initial employment levels are insignificant. By the same token, growth in 
employment (EMPCH) has a positive direct effect on population growth, hence providing 
additional evidence that increased labor demand induces population growth. The estimated 
coefficient for the indirect effect of EMPCH is positive and insignificant, while the total effect is 
positive and highly significant. 
The estimated results further show that initial environmental regulations (ENREG92) 
have a negative direct effect on population growth and its coefficient is significant at the 1 
percent level. This finding is in accord with results from the non-spatial model. Similarly, the 
indirect effects of initial environmental regulation are negative and significant. These results 
further show that changes in environmental regulation in one county have negative spillover 
effects in surrounding counties and reduce population growth. Although the direct and indirect 
estimates for initial environmental regulations are significant, the total effect estimate for initial 
environmental regulations is insignificant. The insignificant result for the total effect may be due 
to the fact that the linear combination of the direct and indirect fails to attain the restrictive 0.99 
confidence interval and, thus causes the linear combination of the direct and indirect effects to be 
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insignificant.9 After changing the confidence from the 99% to the upper 95% confidence 
interval, the coefficient estimates for the direct, indirect, and total effects are all highly 
significant (see appendix A).   
Notable also is that the direct effect estimate of change in environmental regulations 
(ENREGCH) is positive and significant at the 1 percent level, while the indirect and total effect 
estimates are insignificant. The parameter estimate for direct effect of per capita income growth 
(PCICH) has the anticipated positive sign and is statistically significant. Further, per capita 
income growth appears to exhibit a positive indirect effect on population growth and is 
significant at the 5 percent level. The positive indirect or spillover effect suggests that growth in 
per capita income in a given county influences population growth in neighboring counties. The 
total effect of per capita income growth is positive and significant. The parameter estimate for 
the total effect suggests that a 1 point increase in per capita income in a given county increases 
population growth for that county and other neighboring counties by 1.744 points.  
Consistent with expectations, manufacturing establishment (MFG) has a positive direct 
effect on population growth and its coefficient is significant at the 10 percent level. Similarly, 
manufacturing establishment has a positive indirect and total effect on population, but the 
coefficients for both (indirect and total effect) are insignificantly different from zero. 
Unemployment rate (UNEMP) has the expected negative direct effect, and a further review also 
shows that unemployment rate has a positive indirect effect on population growth. This means 
than an increase in unemployment rate in one county will positively influence population growth 
in neighboring counties.  
                                                          
9 Derivation of the direct, indirect, and total effects uses an iterative process known as the Markov Chain Monte 
Carlo methods (MCMC) and the estimates reported in table 5.5 are based on the upper 99 percent confidence 
interval.  I thank Professor Donald Lacombe for his help in understanding why it is possible to have significant 
individual effect results, but insignificant total effect results. 
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Local government expenditure (LGEXP) has a positive direct, indirect, and total effect on 
population growth. These findings reveal that goods and services provided by local governments 
will induce population growth in own county and neighboring counties. By comparison, per 
capita local tax (PCTAX) has a negative direct effect on population growth, but is insignificant. 
The indirect and total effect of the local tax variable is negative and significant at the 10 percent 
level, respectively. Estimated results show that when median housing values (MHVAL) increase 
in a given county, this has a negative direct effect on the county‟s population growth. Likewise, 
an increase in median housing values in one county appears to exert a negative indirect or spatial 
spillover effect on population growth in other neighboring counties. The total effect for median 
housing value is negative and is insignificant. 
Like housing values, local property taxes (PROPTAX) have a negative direct effect on 
population growth. The implication of this finding is that an increase in county property taxes 
discourages firms and households from locating in that county, thereby thwarting population 
growth. The indirect effect of property taxes is similarly negative and its coefficient is 
statistically significant at the 1 percent level. The direct effect for amenities index (AMEND) is 
positive and significant, while the indirect effect is insignificant. The total effect for amenities is 
positive and significant at the 5 percent level. Based on the positive direct effect of state road 
densities, it is inferred that an increase in state road density (ROADDEN) increases population 
growth.  
5.2.2 SDM Results for Change in Employment Equation 
Estimated results for the change in total employment equation are presented in table 5.6. 
The estimated coefficient for  is positive (0.6467) and significant at the 5 percent level, and 
thus provides evidence of strong spatial dependence. An examination of the results reveals that 
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initial condition for total employment (EMP92) has a negative and significant direct effect on 
change in employment. This finding confirms the non-spatial results that there is convergence in 
employment in the Appalachia. Initial employment has a positive indirect effect, but the 
coefficient is insignificant. The initial condition for population (POP92) and change in 
population (POPCH) have a positive direct, indirect, and total effect on employment growth. 
These findings show that employment growth can be influenced by the growth of labor supply 
from within a county and labor supply from other neighboring counties. Over all, these findings 
support the “people follow jobs” hypothesis.  
Change in income (PCICH) has the expected positive direct effect on employment 
growth but is insignificantly different from zero. Like in other estimations, the initial condition 
for environmental regulation (ENREG92) exhibits a negative direct effect on employment 
growth. The negative effect can be attributed to initial high investment costs in abatement 
capital, which directly reduces firms‟ output and labor demand. The indirect effect estimate for 
initial environmental regulations is negative and thus suggests that a change in environmental 
regulations in a given county reduces employment growth in neighboring counties. Further, 
estimates show that a change in a county‟s initial environmental regulation has a negative total 
effect on that county and its neighbors.  
By contrast, the change in environmental regulations variable appears to have a positive 
effect on employment growth. These finding are consistent with previous studies (Goetz et al. 
1996; Porter and van der Linde, 1995; Ringquist, 1993) in revealing that the short-run effects of 
environmental regulation are reduced employment growth, but in the long-run environmental 
regulation positively influences employment growth. 
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Contrary to expectations, the number of manufacturing industries (MFG) has a negative 
direct, indirect, and total effect on employment growth. The coefficient for the direct, indirect, 
and total effect of manufacturing establishment is significant at the 5 percent, 10 percent, and 5 
percent respectively. The negative indirect effect of manufacturing establishment implies that an 
increase in neighboring counties‟ manufacturing establishments reduces employment growth in a 
given county. Similarly, the total effect suggests that an increase in manufacturing establish-
ments in one county decreases that county‟s and neighboring counties‟ employment growth. 
 Spatial regression results, again, confirm that unemployment rates (UNEMP) have a 
negative direct effect on employment growth. Similarly, unemployment rate appears to exert a 
negative indirect effect on employment growth. The interpretation of this negative indirect effect 
is that, an increase in the county unemployment rate negatively affects employment growth in 
neighboring counties. Also, regression results indicate that the amenities index (AMEND) has a 
positive direct effect on employment growth and is significant at the 1 percent level. State road 
density (ROADDEN) has the hypothesized positive direct effect on employment and is 
significant at the 1 percent level.  
Consistent with economic theory and past studies (Carlino and Mills, 1987; Helms, 
1991), local government expenditure (LGEXP) has a positive direct effect on employment 
growth. The estimated positive indirect effect for local government implies that an increase in 
local government expenditure in one county will influence employment growth in neighboring 
counties. Similarly, the percentage of population with bachelor‟s degree (DEGREE) has a 
positive direct effect and is significant at the 10 percent level. The estimate for the indirect 
impact of DEGREE is equal to −42.517, suggesting that an increase in the number of people with 
bachelor‟s degrees in a given county will negatively influence employment growth in 
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neighboring counties. The number of crimes has the anticipated negative direct effect on 
employment growth, but parameter estimates for the indirect and total effects are insignificant. 
5.2.3 SDM Results for Change in Per Capita Income Equation 
SDM estimation results for the change in per capita income (PCICH) equation are 
presented in table 5.7 and the estimated coefficient for the spatial dependence variable  is 
positive (0.7259) and significant at the 5 percent level. As expected, the estimated coefficient for 
initial per capita income (PCI92) exhibits a negative direct effect on per capita income growth—
and therefore, suggests that there is convergence in income in the Appalachia. This result is 
similar to Gebremariam et al. (2007) and Santopietro‟s (2002) finding of income convergence in 
the Appalachia. Estimated results further reveal that initial per capita income has a negative 
indirect and total effect on income growth, and both are significant at the 5 percent and 10 
percent levels, respectively.  
Results for initial population (POP92) closely match the non-spatial results, where initial 
population has a positive direct effect on per capita income growth. This is consistent with the 
view that initial population levels represent available labor supply, and thus an increase in labor 
supply will positively influence growth in income. Results further reveal that an increase in 
initial population in one county has a negative indirect effect on per capita income growth in 
other neighboring counties. Equally, change in population (POPCH) has a positive direct effect 
on per capita income growth, implying that an increase in county labor supply increases county 
per capita income. This seems plausible if we assume that population growth leads to increased 
output, which in turn positively influences growth in per capita income. The estimated indirect 
and total effects are positive and significant at the 5 percent level and 10 percent level, 
respectively. 
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 The direct effect estimates for environmental regulations (ENREG92) show that an 
increase in environmental regulations reduces per capita income growth in a county. One 
explanation for this may be that the high abatement investment costs firms incur in the initial 
period of pollution control negatively affects the labor demand within counties, which in turn, 
results in the decline of per capita income growth. The indirect and total effects are insignificant. 
Parallel to initial environmental regulations, change in environmental regulations (ENREGCH) is 
associated with a positive direct effect on per capita income growth. These findings are similar to 
the results from the non-spatial regressions. However, the indirect and total effect estimates of a 
change in environmental regulation are insignificantly different from zero. 
As hypothesized, employment growth (EMPCH) has a positive direct effect on income 
growth and is significant at the 1 percent level. The estimated positive coefficient for the direct 
effect of employment suggests that a 1 point increase in employment within a county increases 
that county‟s per capita income by 0.202 points. The indirect and total effects for employment 
growth are negative and significantly different from zero. The indirect effect results suggest that 
a change in a given county‟s employment negatively affects income growth of neighboring 
counties. The estimated coefficient for the unemployment rate (UNEMP) has the anticipated 
negative direct effect on per capita income growth and is significant at the 10 percent level. The 
negative coefficient implies that the unemployment rate works by discouraging population 
growth, and this in turn retards income growth. Similarly, the unemployment rate has a negative 
indirect effect and is significant at the 10 percent level.  
The percentage of the population above 65 years (RETIRE) has the anticipated negative 
direct effect, but its coefficient is insignificant. By contrast, the indirect effect for percentage of 
population above 65 years is negative and significant at the 10 percent level. The direct effect 
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estimate of percent of Black population (BLACK) has the anticipated negative sign and confirms 
findings from the non-spatial regression model about the inverse relationship between Black 
population and income.   
5.2.4 SDM Results for Change in Environmental Regulations Equation 
Table 5.8 presents summary SDM results for the change in environmental regulations 
equation (ENREGCH). The estimated coefficient for  is positive (  = 0.539) and significant at 
the 5 percent level, hence providing evidence for the existence of spatial dependence. The direct 
effects estimate for initial environmental regulations (ENREG92) has the expected positive sign, 
and its coefficient is statistically significant at the 1 percent level. This means that counties with 
stringent initial environmental regulation are likely to experience stringent environmental 
regulation in future. The estimated indirect effect for initial environmental regulation is positive 
but insignificant, while the total effect estimate for initial environmental regulation is positive 
and significant at the 1 percent. The estimate of the total effect is equal to 0.6594 and is 
significant at the 5 percent level. The interpretation of this is that a one point increase in county 
‟s initial environmental regulation will increase environmental regulation stringency in that 
county and neighboring counties by 0.6594. The positive total influence of county ‟s 
environmental regulations on neighboring counties environmental regulations is suggestive of 
the strategic interaction phenomena, which is consistent with the race to the top hypothesis. This 
means that an increase in environmental regulations in one county provides an incentive for 
neighboring counties to increase their environmental regulations. Eliste and Fredriksson (2002) 
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find evidence of strategic interaction among a cross-section of countries in the determination of 
environmental regulations for the agricultural sector.10  
Consistent with expectations, initial per capita income (PCI92) has a direct positive effect 
on environmental regulations. This finding supports the hypothesis that higher income people 
will demand better environmental quality, and thus will demand more stringent environmental 
regulation. The estimated indirect and total effect for initial levels of per capita is positive and 
significant at the 1 percent level, respectively. Change in population (POPCH) has a positive 
direct effect on environmental regulations as hypothesized. This finding is very important 
because it shows that an increase in population will lead to greater pollution levels and thus exert 
an upward pressure on environmental regulations. By the same token, change in population level 
has a positive indirect and total effect.  
Change in per capita income (PCICH) also exhibits a positive direct effect on 
environmental regulations and is significant at the 1 percent level. The indirect effect for change 
in per capita income is negative and insignificant.  The effect of increasing a single county‟s per 
capita income has a positive cumulative effect on neighboring counties‟ environmental regu-
lation. In a related manner, the direct effect estimate of total employment change (EMPCH) has 
the expected positive sign and is significant at the 1 percent level. Total employment change is 
associated with a positive indirect and total effect on environmental regulations. These findings 
are important in that they reveal the transboundary problem of pollution, which may stem from 
different employment sectors in neighboring counties.  
There is strong evidence that an increase in manufacturing establishments (MFG) has a 
positive direct effect on environmental regulations and the coefficient is significant at the 1 
                                                          
10 Eliste and Fredriksson (2002) emphasize that the degree to which countries strategically interact depends on the 
geographical distance and degree of trade openness. Fredriksson and Millimet (2002) also find evidence of strategic 
interaction in environmental policymaking among neighboring U.S. states. 
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percent level. This finding illustrates that manufacturing industries are more likely to emit large 
quantities of pollutants, which negatively affect air quality and thus influence the stringency of 
environmental regulation. Both the indirect and total effects associated with manufacturing 
establishments have insignificant coefficients. On the other hand, the percentage of population 
employed in manufacturing (MFGEMP) has negative direct, indirect, and total impacts on 
environmental regulations. However, only the indirect and total effects are significantly different 
from zero. 
The direct effect estimate for the percentage of the population below 5 years and above 
65 years (RISK) is positive. This suggests that an increase in these two segments of the 
population positively influences environmental regulation stringency in the affected county. 
Support for stringent environmental regulation also comes from environmental interest groups, 
such as the Sierra Club (SIERRA). The direct and indirect effect of Sierra chapters is positive but 
insignificant, while the total effect is positive and significant. The percentage of the population 
driving to work (POPDRIVE) has the expected positive direct effect on environmental regulation 
stringency, but its coefficient is not significantly different from zero. On the other hand, the 
indirect and total effect estimates for POPDRIVE are positive and significantly different from 
zero. These findings support the theory that increased vehicle miles travelled contribute to air 
pollution and thus induce more stringent environmental regulation. State road density 
(ROADDEN) has positive direct and total effects.    
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Table 5.5: SDM Estimation Results of Change in Population 
Independent 
Variable 
Model Estimates & 
Spatially lagged 
Estimates Direct Effect Indirect Effect  Total Effect  
Coefficient     p-level Coefficient t-prob Coefficient t-prob Coefficient t-prob 
POP92 −0.157*** 0 −0.153*** 0 −0.063 0.9464 −0.216** 0.002 
EMP92 0.084 0.239 0.082 0.469 0.042 0.9987 0.124 0.851 
ENREG92 −0.426*** 0 −0.446*** 0 −0.782** 0.0046 −0.928 0.222 
EMPCH 2.034*** 0 2.036*** 0 0.013 0.9672 2.049*** 0 
PCICH 1.076*** 0 1.090*** 0 0.655** 0.0031 1.744* 0.011 
ENREGCH 0.198*** 0 0.184*** 0 0.662 0.5402 0.846 0.226 
MFG 6.835* 0.028 6.893* 0.050 2.582 0.8139 9.475 0.409 
UNEMP −49.235 0.127 −46.415 0.272 140.921 0.2816 94.506 0.483 
LGEXP 0.293*** 0 0.299*** 0 0.285** 0.0012 0.583** 0.003 
PCTAX −0.519 0.307 −0.619 0.551 −4.915* 0.0831 −5.534* 0.046 
METRO −554.293 0.054 −533.646 0.124 1046.955* 0.0339 513.310 0.645 
MHVAL −0.047*** 0 −0.048*** 0 0.062 0.9989 0.014 0.186 
PROPTAX −32.917** 0.001 −32.67*** 0 −13.036*** 0.0004 −45.713** 0.009 
AMEND 768.664*** 0 773.99*** 0 225.352 0.4732 999.347** 0.001 
ROADDEN 3370.606** 0.008 3430.85* 0.012 2839.834 0.3894 6270.685* 0.057 
W-POP92 −0.131 0.005             
W-EMP92 0.063 0.472             
W-ENREG92 −0.898 0.090             
W-EMPCH 2.426 0.007             
W-PCICH −1.294 0.272             
W-ENREGCH 0.165 0.019             
W-MFG 5.600 0.481             
W-UNEMP −23.308 0.115             
W-LGEXP −0.165 0             
W-PCTAX −0.828 0.006             
W-METRO 959.226 0.143             
W-MHVAL 0.010 0             
W-PROPTAX −17.495 0.123             
W-AMEND 614.334 0.486             
W-ROADDEN 1549.367 0.284             
 rho  0.5210** 0.009             
 
Note: ***, **, and * denote 1, 5, and 10 percent significance level, respectively 
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Table 5.6: SDM Estimation Results of Change in Employment 
Independent 
Variable 
Model Estimates & 
Spatially lagged 
Estimates Direct Effect Indirect Effect  Total Effect  
Coefficient     p-level Coefficient t-prob Coefficient t-prob Coefficient t-prob 
POP92 0.0991*** 0 0.099*** 0 0.0203* 0.041 0.119*** 0 
EMP92 −0.0192* 0.028 −0.019*** 0.057 0.011 0.735 −0.0087 0.375 
ENREG92 −0.124*** 0 −0.123*** 0 −0.0901* 0.051 −0.0667** 0.005 
PCICH 0.040 0.151 0.0397 0.303 −0.064 0.614 −0.024 0.860 
ENREGCH 0.744*** 0 0.739*** 0 0.041 0.605 0.781** 0.001 
POPCH 0.533*** 0 0.531*** 0 0.0142 0.858 0.546*** 0 
UNEMP −40.221* 0.039 −40.581*** 0.087 −116.48* 0.066 −157.065* 0.015 
LGEXP 0.136*** 0 0.134*** 0 0.0939 0.238 0.228** 0.007 
DEGREE 26.934* 0.017 26.849* 0.033 −42.518* 0.039 −15.669* 0.036 
PROPTAX −3.8406 0.226 −3.865 0.456 −8.3874 0.340 −12.25* 0.074 
MFG −6.2909** 0.001 −6.321** 0.001 −8.368* 0.096 −14.689** 0.004 
CRIME −0.0281 0.260 −0.0276 0.540 0.1836 0.172 0.156 0.269 
METRO 439.367* 0.011 439.893* 0.022 20.5329 0.968 460.4266 0.356 
AMEND 332.47*** 0 333.63*** 0 −290.709* 0.053 42.926*** 0 
VOTE 6.1980 0.196 6.3061 0.391 39.194* 0.013 45.499** 0.003 
ROADDEN 312.91*** 0 316.88*** 0 232.298 0.878 549.177* 0.012 
W-POP92 0.016*** 0             
W-EMP92 −0.017 0.366             
W-ENREG92 0.283 0.212             
W-PCICH 0.063 0.305             
W-ENREGCH 0.764 0.334             
W-POPCH −0.0023 0.482             
W-UNEMP −68.864* 0.035             
W-LGEXP 0.087 0.111             
W-DEGREE 42.156* 0.019             
W-PROPTAX −8.0512 0.165             
W-MFG −7.9363* 0.044             
W-CRIME −0.1789* 0.080             
W-METRO 5.7949 0.492             
W-AMEND 
−272.303
* 0.019             
W-VOTE 37.904** 0.009             
W-ROAD −124.871 0.464             
rho 0.647** 0.004             
Note: ***, **, and * denote 1, 5, and 10 percent significance level, respectively 
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Table 5.7: SDM Estimation Results of Change in Per Capita Income 
Independent 
Variable 
Model Estimates & 
Spatially lagged 
Estimates Direct Effect Indirect Effect  Total Effect  
Coefficient     p-level Coefficient t-prob Coefficient t-prob Coefficient t-prob 
PCI92 −0.467*** 0 −0.435*** 0.0003 −0.310** 0.0066 −0.746* 0.0468 
POP92 0.218*** 0 0.202*** 0 −0.037 0.3577 0.165** 0.0047 
ENREG92 −0.201*** 0 −0.267*** 0 0.135 0.719 −0.132 0.1247 
EMPCH 0.289*** 0 0.203*** 0 −0.983* 0.0933 −0.781** 0.0048 
ENREGCH 0.103*** 0 0.109*** 0 −0.001 0.9844 0.109 0.3194 
POPCH 0.168*** 0 0.197 0.3713 0.308** 0.0095 1.205* 0.0644 
BLACK −36.351 0.428 −34.53*** 0 −33.285 0.5056 −67.819** 0.0051 
RETIRE −2.378*** 0 −2.572 0.4736 −1.501* 0.013 −4.073 0.9693 
MFG −24.709 0.214 −23.999 0.9667 −21.636 0.7851 −45.636 0.1106 
UNEMP −0.913* 0.087 −0.978* 0.0369 −0.877* 0.0184 −1.856* 0.0700 
PCTAX −0.579* 0.014 −0.599 0.4819 0.128* 0.0866 −0.472 0.1643 
DEGREE −33.584 0.224 −35.724 0.1372 −1.885 0.319 33.838 0.812 
AMEND −88.870* 0.059 −91.825 0.3501 −21.003 0.743 112.828 0.286 
ACTIVE 5.946* 0.014 4.255 0.1307 93.923 0.6336 98.178 0.9707 
VOTE 4.283* 0.064 4.792* 0.0857 3.921 0.6436 8.712 0.3928 
W*PCI92 −0.543* 0.059             
W*POP92 0.093 0.177             
W*ENREG92 0.115* 0.064             
W*EMPCH −0.548*** 0             
W*ENREGCH 0.107 0.334             
W*POPCH 0.239 0.167             
W*BLACK 56.475 0.133             
W*RETIRE −1.848 0.427             
W*MFG 22.092* 0.045             
W*UNEMP −1.103 0.425             
W*PCTAX 0.1247 0.113             
W*DEGREE −31.695 0.279             
W*AMEND −22.33*** 0.005             
W*ACTIVE 8.7412 0.378             
W*VOTE 28.317* 0.011             
rho 0.726 0.002             
 
Note: ***, **, and * denote 1, 5, and 10 percent significance level, respectively 
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Table 5.8: SDM Estimation Results of Change in Environmental Regulations 
Indepen-
dent 
Variables 
Model Estimates & 
Spatially lagged 
Estimates Direct Effect Indirect Effect  Total Effect  
Coefficient     p-level Coefficient t-prob Coefficient t-prob Coefficient t-stat 
PCI92 0.060*** 0 0.059*** 0 0.0033*** 0.0009 0.0623*** 0 
ENREG92 0.676*** 0 0.679*** 0 0.0205 0.9190 0.7004** 0.0020 
POPCH 0.0013*** 0 0.0012*** 0 0.018* 0.0100 0.0192*** 0 
EMPCH 0.0413*** 0 0.039*** 0 0.042* 0.0555 0.081*** 0.0004 
PCICH 0.0825*** 0 0.0983 0 −0.064 0.4548 0.0343* 0.0400 
MFG 0.0021*** 0 0.0020*** 0.0002 −0.0015 0.4155 0.001 0.7642 
MFGEMP −0.0096 0.4835 −0.0054 0.9991 −0.0101* 0.0296 −0.0156* 0.0205 
POVRATE 0.0057* 0.0895 0.0055 0.1947 −0.0142 0.1353 −0.0087 0.3411 
BLACK 0.0040 0.434 0.0041 0.8646 0.0017 0.6954 0.0058 0.5446 
RISK 0.0244*** 0 0.0245*** 0.0004 0.0027 0.8754 0.0272 0.1966 
DEGREE 0.0034 0.147 0.0034 0.3040 0.0051 0.3661 0.0085 0.7361 
METRO −0.1032** 0.0055 −0.1033* 0.0109 −0.0043 0.9718 −0.1076 0.3723 
SIERRA 0.0138 0.3665 0.0148 0.7336 0.1025 0.2023 0.1173* 0.0893 
VOTE 0.0031* 0.0515 0.0031* 0.0985 0.0047 0.2549 0.0078* 0.048 
POPDRIVE 0.0022 0.2725 0.0019 0.6004 0.0266** 0.0051 0.0285** 0.0082 
ROADDEN 0.3523* 0.0345 0.3586* 0.0588 0.6025 0.1466 0.9611* 0.0127 
W-PCI92 −0.0015*** 0             
W-ENREG92 0.0868** 0.005             
W-POPCH 0.0032 0.484 
      W-EMPCH 0.0343* 0.032             
W-PCICH 0.0284** 0.008             
W-MFG −0.0015 0.17             
W-MFGEMP −0.0092* 0.016             
W-POVRATE −0.0135* 0.0555             
W-BLACK 0.0015 0.3575             
W-RISK −0.0049 0.385             
W-DEGREE −0.005 0.164             
W-METRO 0.0656 0.471             
W-SIERRA 0.0915 0.1115             
W-VOTE −0.004 0.143             
W-
POPDRIVE 0.024 0.003             
rho 0.539 0.0018             
Note: ***, **, and * denote 1, 5, and 10 percent significance level, respectively 
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Figure 5.2: 2004 Attainment and Non-attainment Areas in the U.S. 8 Hour Ozone Standard 
 
Source: EPA 
 
Figure 5.3: 2007 Attainment and Non-Attainment Counties in Appalachia 
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Figure 5.4: 1994 DISTRIBUTION OF AFRICAN AMERICANS IN APPALACHIA 
 
 
 
Figure5.5: 1992 UNEMPLYMENT RATES IN APPALACHIA 
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CHAPTER 6 
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
5.0 Introduction 
The relationship between environmental regulation and economic growth has been a 
subject of long standing debate among economists and policymakers. The purpose of this 
research is to address a number of questions that have arisen concerning the relationship between 
environmental regulation and economic growth. The questions are: to what extent does 
environmental regulation influence regional growth patterns and to what extent do regional 
factors influence environmental regulations? To address these questions, this study, unlike 
previous research, assumes that simultaneous interactions exist among changes in environmental 
regulations, per capita income, population, and employment. In this vein, the first contribution of 
this research is the ability to theoretically and empirically model the simultaneous relationships 
among changes in environmental regulations, population, total employment, and per capita 
income at the county-level. The analysis in this study assumes that the effects of environmental 
regulations go beyond regulated firms. 
Two econometric techniques are used to empirically examine the relationship between 
changes in per capita income, employment, population, and environmental regulations. First, the 
four systems of equations are estimated using the three-stage least squares technique. The second 
estimation uses the Spatial Durbin Model (SDM) and is estimated in MATLAB using the 8 
nearest neighbors‟ spatial weight matrix. Thus, the second contribution of this study is the use of 
the Spatial Durbin Model (SDM) that quantifies the direct effects, indirect effects (spatial 
spillovers), and the total or cumulative impacts. The direct effects represent the changes on a 
given county‟s growth outcomes due to changes in own county characteristics, while the indirect 
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impacts are spatial spillovers on neighboring counties that stem from changing a given county‟s 
characteristics. The total or cumulative effects quantified as the sum of the direct and indirect 
effect, measures the cumulative impact of a change in a county‟s characteristics averaged over 
all other regions.  
On the whole, both the three-stage least squares and SDM estimations produce robust 
results by showing that environmental regulations implemented at the county-level are not 
detrimental to regional growth. Model estimates show that initial environmental regulation 
stringency is negatively related to growth (population, employment, and per capita income), 
while the change in environmental regulation is positively associated with regional growth. The 
initial conditions for environmental regulations intuitively mean that firms in non-attainment 
counties invest in pollution abatement technologies in order to bring the air quality in compliance 
with federal standards. As a consequence, the initial conditions can be interpreted as the short-
run effects of environmental regulations due to the fact that firms in non-attainment regions will 
invest in pollution abatement technologies in the initial period. Investments in the initial period 
result in increased production costs and reduced output. However, because of the spinoff effects, 
other sectors of the economy will also be negatively affected and thus negatively affect regional 
growth.  
Considering the length of the period of analysis in this study (15 years), the change in 
environmental regulations can be interpreted as the long-run effects. Within the endogenous 
growth theory framework, firms adopt improved technologies which expand their production 
functions as well as improve environmental quality. Theoretically, this means that the long-run 
effect of environmental regulations is improved output and better environmental quality. Thus, it 
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is not surprising that the change in environmental regulations is consistently found to have a 
positive effect on growth in employment, population, and per capita income.   
6.1 Summary and Conclusions, Non-Spatial Models 
In the three-stage least squares estimation, population change or growth is positively 
associated with growth in per capita income and employment. This is a key finding that suggests 
that an increase in labor demand through expansions in economic output positively influences 
population growth in Appalachia. Results from the non-spatial model show that change in 
environmental regulation is positively associated with population growth. The presumption is 
that the initial conditions of environmental regulations increase the compliance and operating 
costs for regulated firms and thus retard economic growth. The change in environmental 
regulations is intuitively interpreted as the long-run effects; therefore, the long-run benefit of 
environmental regulation stringency is improved environmental quality, which also directly 
stimulates population growth. The unexpected negative effect of manufacturing establishments 
on population growth demonstrates the declining role of manufacturing in the Appalachian 
economy and could also be construed to mean that manufacturing jobs in the Appalachia are low 
paying. Local government expenditure programs seem to be important in explaining Appalachian 
population growth. This is very important because it shows that local government expenditure 
policies play key roles in the development process in Appalachian counties.  
Three-stage least squares estimate further reveal that employment growth can be 
stimulated by population growth. This finding seems plausible if we assume that labor demand 
parallels labor supply, or if the rate of growth of population is slow relative to employment 
growth. Environmental regulations pursued at the county level seem to negatively affect 
employment growth only in the initial stages of implementation, but after a certain time lag, 
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environmental regulations positively influence employment growth. Thus, this study concludes 
that environmental regulation does not slow long-term economic growth, but rather stimulates 
employment growth. This seems reasonable because the initial cost outlays for abatement 
technology are sunk costs, and therefore, rational profit maximizing firms do not base their 
future production decisions on sunk costs. Under this assumption, the efficient technology that 
firms invest in serves the dual role of improving productivity and enhancing environmental 
quality. These findings complement the theoretical analysis in chapter 3. In addition, these fin-
dings support Tannenwald‟s (1997) hypothesis that internalization of externalities makes juris-
dictions attractive to business, households, and leisure travelers. Therefore, these findings should 
offer some consolation to businesses, politicians, and local policymakers who fret about the 
negative economic impacts of environmental regulation implementation.  
Similarly, three-stage least squares estimation reveals that environmental regulation only 
negatively affects per capita income growth in the short-term, but has a positive influence on per 
capita income growth in the long-run. Under this circumstance, these findings reinforce the 
notion that environmental regulation enhances a jurisdiction‟s environmental quality, thereby 
making the area more attractive to workers, executives, businesses, retirees, and so on. Further-
more, the results indicate that growth in employment, combined with percentage increase in 
population with bachelor‟s degrees are associated with growth in per capita income. Results 
further support the bidirectional causal relationship between population growth and per capita 
income growth. However, the percent of Black population, property taxes, poverty rate, 
percentage of the population above 65 years, and local taxes significantly reduce growth in per 
capita income.  
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Last but not least, empirical results from the three-stage least squares estimation show 
that environmental regulation stringency is influenced by employment growth, initial environ-
mental regulation, per capita income, county poverty rate, percent of black population, and 
percentage of vulnerable population. An increase in the number of county manufacturing 
establishments and employment tends to exert upward pressure on environmental regulation. The 
study also finds empirical evidence that suggest that environmental interest groups, percentage of 
population with bachelor‟s degree, Democratic Party influence, population density, percentage of 
population driving to work, and road density have a positive effect on environmental regulations 
stringency.  
6.2 Summary and Conclusions from the SDM Model 
To provide insights concerning spatial interdependences among the variables, the spatial 
Durbin Model (SDM) is employed. The motivation for using the SDM model stems from the 
plausibility that a county‟s characteristics (both dependent variable and explanatory variables) 
may influence growth rates in neighboring counties. In this case, there is a need to capture the 
spillover impacts, which cannot be captured in non-spatial regressions. The SDM estimation 
allows inferences to be made in terms of direct impacts, indirect or spillover impacts, and total 
(cumulative) impacts.  
Overall, SDM estimations are consistent with the non-spatial regressions by revealing 
that environmental regulations negatively affect regional growth only in the short-term period, 
but in the long run, environmental regulations stimulate growth in population, per capita income, 
and employment. Similarly, SDM estimations present strong evidence that environmental 
regulation outcomes are positively influenced by changes in employment, population, and per 
capita income. The SDM estimations further reveal that changes in a county‟s environmental 
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regulation, per capita income, employment, and population do not only depend on own-county 
characteristics (direct effects), but are influenced by other counties‟ characteristics (indirect 
effects). For example, based on the positive coefficients for the total effects of initial 
environmental regulations, this study concludes that there is some form of strategic interaction 
among some Appalachian counties in environmental policymaking. The strategic interaction is in 
a form of the race to top, which means that a given county‟s environmental regulation stringency 
has a positive impact on neighboring counties‟ environmental regulation outcomes. This finding 
is very important because it shows that even in the face of stiff interstate economic competition 
counties (and states) do not lower environmental regulations, but instead mimic neighboring 
counties‟ stringent environmental standards.  
The results from the SDM estimations overall show that a county‟s growth rate will not 
only depend on its characteristics, but also on indirect impacts emanating from neighboring 
counties. These indirect impacts arise due to the spatial connectivity of the counties and tend to 
be localized (LeSage and Fischer, 2009). Therefore, the second contribution of this research is 
the ability to illustrate the important role spillover effects play in regional growth.  
6.3 Policy Recommendations 
Empirical findings from both the non-spatial model and spatial Durbin model have 
important policy implications. First, the results indicate that population growth is stimulated by 
an increase in per capita income, employment growth, local government expenditure, and 
amenities. Population growth entails supply of labor with a variety of skills, and therefore, 
counties that are concerned about population growth should adopt economic strategies that will 
stimulate growth in employment and provide high incomes. By creating a strong economy, the 
educated Appalachians will be encouraged to stay in the region.  
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Second, cognizant of the positive direct and indirect impacts that local government 
expenditure policies have on regional economies, economically distressed Appalachian counties 
should find means of increasing the provision of public goods and services. The increased and 
continued supply of public goods and services has a direct effect of attracting new firms and 
stimulating growth of existing firms, and this indirectly induces population and per capita 
income growth. Consistent with economic base theory, manufacturing‟s role cannot be ignored, 
given that manufacturing has the potential to generate a large number of jobs. This study shows 
that employment growth and per capita income growth can be stimulated by manufacturing 
establishments. Therefore, there is a need to revitalize the role of manufacturing in Appalachia.  
 Third, the analyses conducted in both the non-spatial and spatial model underscore the 
fact that environmental regulation has a negative impact on regional growth only in the short-
term. The long-term benefit of environmental regulation is improved firm competitiveness, as 
hypothesized by Porter and van der Linde (1995), and improved environmental quality. 
Therefore, states working to simultaneously improve their business climate and stimulate 
economic growth should not neglect environmental regulation by lobbying for less stringent 
standards. Instead, state governments should develop state implementation plans (SIPs) that 
enhance their jurisdictions‟ environmental quality, induce innovation in firms, and thus stimulate 
long-term growth through migration of firms and households.  
The analyses conducted also highlight that environmental regulation outcomes are 
positively influenced by socio-economic and demographic factors. Thus, another policy 
implication is that, besides imposing stringent environmental regulation on polluting industries, 
there is need to pay attention to socio-economic and demographic forces that contribute to 
pollution.  
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6.4 Research Limitations and Suggestions of Future Research 
There are several issues in the research that have not been effectively addressed. The first 
limitation of this study pertains to data. For example, data related to land use patterns could have 
been incorporated in the model in order to highlight its impact on regional growth and environ-
mental regulation setting because land use patterns reflect human impacts on the environment. 
Other data problems pertain to the inability to account for effects of technological changes on 
regional growth and environmental regulation outcomes. Inarguably, technological changes have 
implications for both regional growth and air quality. Lastly, while the use of the county 
attainment status is a good proxy for environmental regulation stringency, it contains only a 
limited amount of information. However, because the environmental regulation index 
constructed provides some spatial variation in implementation, we believe that the county 
attainment status is a reasonable proxy in this study.  
The empirical findings indicate that environmental regulation positively influences 
economic growth in the long-term. This result needs further attention in the form of further 
research that investigates the time lag between environmental regulation change and improved 
economic performance. This can be achieved by using a dynamic model and data that cover a 
considerable time period.  
Empirical evidence that indicates that counties with high unemployment rates and high 
Black populations are associated with stringent environmental regulation stringency should be 
interpreted with caution. Could we be committing a type I error by inferring that poor 
neighborhoods are not excessively exposed to air pollution relative to other communities? 
Therefore, there is a need to further investigate the simultaneous relationship between rate of 
exposure to pollutants and environmental regulation stringency.  
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APPENDIX A 
Table 5.6: SDM Estimation Results of Change in Population (95% confidence Interval) 
Independent 
Variables 
Model Estimates & 
Spatially lagged 
Estimates Direct Effect Indirect Effect  Total Effect  
Coefficient     p-level Coefficient t-prob Coefficient t-prob Coefficient t-prob 
POP92 −0.189*** 0 −0.188*** 0 −0.057*** 0 −0.245*** 0 
EMP92 0.122*** 0 0.124*** 0 0.064*** 0 0.188*** 0 
ENREG92 −0.467 0 −0.467*** 0 −0.322*** 0 −0.789*** 0 
EMPCH 1.854*** 0 1.856*** 0 0.087** 0.007 1.943*** 0 
PCICH 1.235*** 0 1.235*** 0 0.534*** 0 1.769*** 0 
ENREGCH 0.167*** 0 0.171*** 0 0.233** 0.005 0.404*** 0.0001 
MFG 6.663* 0 6.662*** 0 2.582*** 0 9.244*** 0 
UNEMP −48.235* 0.011 −48.232* 0.054 35.056 0.345 −13.176 0.483 
LGEXP 0.297*** 0 0.302*** 0 0.268** 0.0012 0.570*** 0 
PCTAX −0.545* 0.024 −0.545* 0.032 −0.234* 0.067 −0.779* 0.039 
METRO −534.333*** 0 −534.146*** 0 234.012* 0.0245 −300.134* 0.023 
MHVAL −0.054*** 0 −0.055*** 0 0.046*** 0 −0.009*** 0 
PROPTAX −33.113*** 0 −33.113*** 0 −16.235*** 0 −49.348*** 0 
AMEND 763.321*** 0 765.67*** 0 223.241** 0.0041 988.911** 0.001 
ROADDEN 3254.403*** 0 3254.231*** 0 2634.002*** 0 5888.233*** 0 
W-POP92 −0.178*** 0             
W-EMP92 0.143* 0.034             
W-ENREG92 −0.658* 0.023             
W-EMPCH 2.033*** 0             
W-PCICH −1.445** 0.0063             
W-ENREGCH 0.173** 0.0014             
W-MFG 5.888* 0.054             
W-UNEMP −27.032 0.312             
W-LGEXP −0.156*** 0             
W-PCTAX −0.783** 0.002             
W-METRO 931.023* 0.091             
W-MHVAL 0.0654*** 0             
W-PROPTAX −26.342* 0.081             
W-AMEND 634.421 0.356             
W-ROADDEN 2317.764 0.133             
 rho  0.895*** 0             
 
